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TAX POLICY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
MIRIT EYAL-COHEN* & ANA SANTOS RUTSCHMAN**
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed severe underinvestment in sustained research and 
development (R&D) of vaccines to prevent public health crises. Evidently, policy and lawmakers 
have attempted to establish incentives for pharmaceutical R&D, spending billions upon billions of 
dollars in the process. However, they so far utilized a limited set of tools such as patents, grants, 
and to a lesser extent prizes to encourage discoveries in vaccine technology. In particular, 
commentators have paid relatively little attention to the role of taxation in delivering efficient 
vaccine research incentives. 
This Article fills this gap in the literature and in policy by examining ways to better employ 
the tax system to spur investments in vaccine discoveries. We demonstrate that, when designed 
properly, tax apparatuses can offer an incomparable advantageits ability to harness market-
based mechanisms ex ante thus economize on resources, administrative costs, regulatory capture, 
and information problems. By contrast, other regulatory interventions currently used to stimulate 
investment in R&D, require resource-intensive interventions, either through the provision of 
advanced funding or other types of administrative resources, or both. 
Building on this analytical framework, the Article offers a novel insight: the market-based 
characteristics of tax incentives make the tax system especially well-suited to address 
underinvestment in pharmaceutical innovation, particularly in the field of vaccine research. Based 
on this insight, we develop here a proposal for tax policy that spurs research in vaccines for 
emerging infectious diseases before outbreaks occur in a more simplified, administrative, and 
efficient manner than current policy tools. Our proposal provides R&D support in a predictable, 
streamlined fashion thus minimizing investment risk in uncertain vaccine development processes. 
It further illustrates how the tax system can be used as an effective tool for equitable distribution 
of the cost of developing vaccines for emerging diseases, which to date has never been fully 
explored. Our proposal starts that conversation by offering a blueprint for possible interventions 
in other traditionally underfunded areas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has shed renewed critical light on the need for sustained 
development of vaccines and drugs, which are crucial to prevent, respond to, and attenuate the 
effects of large-scale public health crises. As the world accompanies the coronavirus vaccine race,1
as well as the development of COVID-19 therapeutics candidates like the drug remdesivir,2 the 
limitations of current incentives models in biopharmaceutical innovation become readily apparent.  
Preventing and preparing for outbreaks of infectious diseases is critical in maintaining 
health and economic wellbeing. From the Measles outbreaks in the state of New York in 2019 to 
transnational outbreaks such as Zika in 2015-16 and, more recently, COVID-19there is a clear 
need for sustaining a pre-existing R&D infrastructure of some magnitude. In particular, public 
health preparedness requires robust investment in vaccine R&D, as well as in drugs targeting 
pathogens often associated with emerging,3 lesser-known4 or non-mainstream5 diseases.  
In spite of their considerable public health value and relative cost-effectiveness,6 R&D in 
many of the vaccines and drugs needed before an outbreak occursor as one unfoldsis often 
1 See e.g. Andy Ridgway, Coronavirus Vaccine: The Race to Create a Cure for COVID-19, SCI. FOCUS (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.sciencefocus.com/the-human-body/coronavirus-vaccine-the-race-to-create-a-cure-for-covid-19/ 
2 See John H. Beigel et al., Remdesivir for the Treatment of Covid-19  Preliminary Report, N. ENGL. J. MED (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2007764. See also infra, XX. 
3 This is the case of COVID-19, the disease caused by a pathogen in the coronavirus family known as SARS-CoV-2. Prior to late 
2019, the scientific community was familiar with SARS-CoV (commonly known as SARS), which was first identified in 2003, but 
not with SARS-CoV-2. 
4 This is the case of Zika, which was identified for the first time in 1947, but it was not until the 2015-16 outbreak that some of the 
most of severe effects of Zika infection were reported. 
5 This is the case of different types of diseases, including the group known as neglected tropical diseases, traditionally endemic 
to the Global South and which have traditionally failed to attract sizable R&D interest, partly due to profitability concerns on the 
part of R&D players whose business model relies primarily on return-on-investment approaches.   
6 See infra, Part II.C. 
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intermittent, underfunded or outright non-existent.7 In the aftermath of the 2014-16 Ebola 
outbreak, the World Health Organization characterized the infectious disease R&D status quo as 
one of lacking preparedness.8 In this work, we focus on an overlooked legal and policy lever as a 
potential catalyst for investment on R&D targeting these traditionally underfunded diseasesthe 
tax system. 
Typically, the patent system is regarded as the default placement in the legal system for 
incentives to investment in risky and resource-intensive research endeavors. Non-patent 
incentives, such as grants, prizes or insurance reimbursement (funded by tax revenues), have 
progressively been recognized as important complementary tools in innovation policy. While 
acknowledged by commentators,9 tax law and policy remain nonetheless largely underexplored as 
meaningful levers in innovation policy. In this Article, we argue that robust innovation policies 
should make further use of the tax systemnot only as a source of revenuebut also as an 
incentive mechanism that can be implemented efficiently and at minimal cost to participants. 
Simply put, tax incentives provide capital-constrained private market players with instant ex ante 
rewards without needing to take extra steps extrinsic to conducting R&D in predesignated areas.  
We further note that the characteristics of tax-based incentiveschief among which their 
mobilization of private-sector players through flexible commitment of their economic resources
render them especially well-suited as catalyzers of private investment in traditionally underfunded 
areas. One of the most prominent of these areas is pharmaceutical R&D on emerging infectious 
diseasesa group of diseases that includes COVID-19, Zika and Ebola, as well as many of the 
pathogens that experts predict will cause significant worldwide outbreaks in the near future.10
Pharmaceutical R&D as a whole has long been known for being capital- and risk-intensive.11 Thus, 
innovators in this space have long relied on patent incentives combined with broad extra-patent 
sources of funding.12 Segments of the pharmaceutical R&D universe, however, have remained 
chronically underfunded, to the detriment of social welfare as public health is a social good.13 For 
reasons we detail below,14 the development of vaccines targeting emerging pathogens has long 
fallen in this category.15
7 See generally Massinissa Si Mehand et al., The WHO R&D Blueprint: 2018 Review of Emerging Infectious Diseases Requiring 
Urgent Research and Development Efforts, 159 ANTIVIRAL RESEARCH 63 (2018), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166354218305643 
8 See Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200 (2018). 
9 See Hemel & Ouellette, infra note 26. 
10 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS (2016), at 6, 
https://www.who.int/blueprint/about/r_d_blueprint_plan_of_action.pdf?ua=1 (listing emerging infectious diseases to be urgently 
addressed). 
11 See, e.g., Tohru Takebe, Ryoka Imai, & Shunsuke Ono, The Current Status of Drug Discovery and Development as Originated 
in United States Academia: The Influence of Industrial and Academic Collaboration on Drug Discovery and Development, 11 CLIN 
TRANSL SCI. 597, 600 (2018) (reporting success rates of academic drug discovery during clinical trials of 19.3% and industrys 
success rates of 9.6%). 
12 See infra, Part II.B. 
13 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 10 (noting a lack of R&D preparedness for emerging infectious diseases likely to translate 
into elevated public health costs).  
14 See infra, Part II.C. 
15 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 188 (1999) (using the example 
of a vaccine that improved the health of millions of people as a desirable project approved under an uncontroversial social welfare 
function even if it violates Pareto standard). See also Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Old Public Health: The Legal 
Framework for the Regulation of Public Health, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1421, 1425-1426 (2004) (defining the theory of public 
health as tracking the economic conception of public goods, i.e. nonexcludable goods that cannot be given to one unless they are 
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Using the case study of vaccine development as the paramount example of an area of 
pharmaceutical R&D in dire need of greater support, we show how developing a technology-
specific approach to tax incentivesin this case, tailored to vaccine R&Dis beneficial from an 
innovation policy and a public health perspective. At the same time, our case study of vaccine 
research illustrates how the larger prescriptive takeaway of the Articlethe need to better design  
and adopt heterogenous and pliable forms of tax-based incentivescan be incorporated into the 
legal system in simplified ways that ensure efficiency and administrability. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Following this Introduction, Part II begins by diagnosing 
structural misalignments between current R&D incentives frameworksdeveloped mainly 
through intellectual property (IP) channelspertaining to socially valuable public goods. This 
misalignment is especially pronounced in the field of pharmaceutical innovation, and in particular 
with regard to drugs and vaccines needed for pandemic and epidemic preparedness. Even though 
these drugs and vaccines offer considerable public health value, underlying R&D is often 
intermittent, underfunded, or outright non-existent.  
Part III discusses non-IP incentives frameworks to promote investment in in the vaccine 
R&D context by surveying current uses of grants, prizes, and other types of incentives. It then 
shows that tax policy remains consistently underused as a locus for providing incentives to vaccine 
R&D. We argue that, from an economic efficiency and distributional justice points of view, 
governments ought to better utilize tax policy to be able to spread the cost of vaccine R&D on all 
taxpayers rather than the few who might be willing to pay for it. Moreover, this Part demonstrates 
that properly employing the tax system as part of the fora of innovation policies not only provides 
superior cost distribution but can also help legislatures with limited information, skills, or capacity 
to evaluate pharmaceutical innovation and create ripe conditions for preparedness.  
Part IV outlines the current universe of tax incentives for domestic innovation, as well as 
their operation and flaws in the pharmaceutical context. It focuses on five main apparatuses: 
Immediate R&D Expensing, Research and Experimentation Credit, Orphan Drug Credit, 
Therapeutic Discovery Project Credit, and Patent Donations. This Part further demonstrates that 
the current tax system nudges market players away from vaccine research and towards ordinary 
drug development and mainstream innovation projects. Thereafter, Part V suggests a new 
framework to better design current tax policy to accommodate vaccine R&D. It proposes a tiered 
system of refundable mechanisms and complementing routes that prioritize qualified vaccine 
discovery projects designated by a special health advisory committee. After surveying the potential 
problems involving such tax routes including abuse and gamesmanship, complexity, and public 
choice opportunities, the Article demonstrates that our proposed scheme can tackle such issues in 
a simpler, more equitable and administrable manner.  
The Article concludes that the tax system can and should be employed more efficiently to 
deliver a supporting framework for research and experimentation of viruses and diseases prior to 
their outbreak. The effectiveness of tax incentives in the vaccine case study lies in their operation 
ex ante and throughout the R&D process while maintaining the independence of market players 
subject-manner decisions. Tax-based incentives leave major decisions to private partiesmaking 
the tax system largely a market-based policy leversuch as a high degree of freedom to choose 
also given to another. Public bads, on the other hand, are inflicted upon others without their consent, as are communicable diseases 
and pollution).  
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the nature and priority given to each R&D study, the distribution of resources to each experiment, 
and the desired level of reward for it. Lastly, designed properly, tax incentives can provide 
innovators utmost flexibility and ways to overcome insurmountable capital constrains and risk-
aversion when pursuing new vaccine technology research. They can provide an effective way to 
receive rewards from society in an early and less uncertain manner rather than waiting to see 
whether substantial R&D investments in vaccine development, testing, and multiple clinical trials 
phases ultimately yield successful results and positive private returns. 
Establishing tax incentives tailored specifically to vaccines for emerging infectious 
diseasessuch as COVID-19, Zika and Ebolacan bolster much needed vaccine preparedness 
before outbreaks occur. To date, no work has fully explored how the tax system can be used 
effectively as a tool to facilitate equitable distribution of the cost of developing drugs and vaccines 
for emerging diseases. This Article initiates the discussion around optimal design of vaccine R&D 
incentives and the distribution of their cost. At the same time, we hope to provide a broader 
blueprint for future work on possible interventions in other traditionally underfunded areas in the 
environmental, energy and health spaces. 
II. A PATENT REGIME TO INCENTIVIZE INNOVATION
A. The Patent System as Catalyst to R&D 
The question of how to best promote investment in high-cost, high-risk areas of science 
and technology has long been debated among scholars and policymakers.16 These discussions are 
fueled, at a least to a certain extent, by the concern that some types of goods, albeit welfare-
enhancing, might fail to attract sufficient funding and R&D interest from the private sector, while 
at the same, the public sector alone cannot see them through from early research stages to 
manufacturing and commercialization.17
Without a mechanism that counterbalances heightened risk (real or perceived) associated 
with R&D processes, as Kenneth Arrow has explained, private companies are likely to invest less 
than is socially optimal in risky endeavors such as invention and research because they cannot 
fully appropriate the benefits of the product of R&D and because of increasing returns in use.18
Such unwillingness or inability to bear risks will give rise to a nonoptimal allocation of resources, 
in that there will be discrimination against risky enterprises as compared with the optimum.19
16 See, generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 41 (Dover ed. 2006)) (discussing the nature of risk involved 
in discovering innovation); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Economic Theory and Entrepreneurial History (1949), 
reprinted in ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURS, INNOVATORS, BUSINESS CYCLES, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 74 (Richard V. 
Clemence ed., 1989) (detailing the risks and rewards of innovation); Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of 
Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1059, 1067 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. 
Willig eds., 1989) (noting the nature of R&D with high risk and long progression); Kenneth Kelly, The Role of Risk Aversion in 
the Allocation of Resources to Invention, NBER Paper, Mar. 1982, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/role-risk-
aversion-allocation-resources-invention/wp051.pdf (debating the different views on underinvestment in innovation).  
17 Because they are knowledge-intensive, these goods are often described as non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-rivalrous goods 
can be consumed by multiple users without a reduction in their quantity or quality. Users of non-excludable goods are unable to 
prevent others from using the same good, absent some intervention designed to eliminate or limit non-excludability, such as the 
imposition of intellectual property rights. See Joseph Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (INGE KAUL ET AL., EDS.) (1999). 
18 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 619 (RICHARD NELSON ED., 1962). But see Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social 
Value of Information, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 562 (1971) (arguing that the private value of an invention can exceed its social 
value, leading to an overinvestment in research.) 
19 Arrow, supra note 18, at 609.
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Against this background, patent systems are viewed primarily as a way to cure market 
failures of underinvestment in technical and scientific areas.20 Absent patent protection, scholars 
noted the price of products will be reduced to the marginal cost of copying deterring future 
investment in developing innovation.21 The dominant worldview depicts patents as incentives 
mechanisms designed to promote investment in areas that might remain underfunded absent the 
conferral of a legal right that enables the patent holder to enjoy some form of market exclusivity 
for a certain period of time.22
According to this narrative, both the main function and justification for the existence of the 
modern patent system is to tend to problems related to market prospectivity: a would-be investor 
might shy away from allocating resources to a particular research and development (R&D) project 
if the anticipated market for an invention is not deemed large or profitable enough to recoup R&D 
costs and/or turn a profit. Under this logic, patents become especially relevant as catalysts to R&D 
when there is a misalignment between the value and the cost of socially desirable goods. As further 
detailed in the next Part, commentators often point out that nowhere is this misalignment more 
evident than in the case of pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical innovation.23 While the 
development of new preventatives and treatments is of strategic importance from a scientific and 
public health point of view, a host of other factors renderaccording to these patent narratives 
investments in these socially valuable goods especially risky: high R&D costs, lengthy R&D 
timelines, scientific complexity and associated risk of failure, cost of regulatory review and, in 
some cases, potentially limited patient populations indicated for a particular drug. 
20 We employ the expression market failure in this Article to refer to situations in which certain types of inefficiencies lead to 
sub-optimal investment in R&D on socially valuable goods.  See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37-40 (2003) (discussing the economic theory underlying patents and the 
risk of underinvestment as prices reduced to marginal cost of copying). See also Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 283 
(2006) (noting market failure is cited as the raison detre for intellectual property, explaining copyright, patent, and even 
trademark.). But see Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the Newtonian World of On-Line 
Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 134 (1997) (arguing the future fair use "will revolve less around market failure, and more 
around the idea of favoring certain classes of users with a statutory privilege"). 
21 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1506 
(2002) (stating in a competitive market the price will be driven down to the marginal cost of copying.). See also Brett M. 
Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 
349 (2000) (determining innovation is a public good that acts as an input for producing a wide range of dependent goods and that 
various forms of innovation market failure arise, thus certain institutions are better suited for correcting certain forms of innovation 
market failure.).  
22 See e.g. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
(6TH ED. 2012); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). 
23 The word pharmaceutical is used in different contexts, but primarily refers to products meeting colloquial, scientific and 
regulatory definitions of medicines and drugs. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, 
https://www.who.int/topics/pharmaceutical_products/en/. Biopharmaceutical refers to a subset of drug or pharmaceutical 
products, comprised of drugs or other products made of living components and structurally complex, such as biologicals (e.g. many 
of the drugs used in the treatment of auto-immune or oncology conditions, as well as vaccines). Because this Article focuses 
primarily on problems arising in the vaccine R&D spacemost existing vaccines belonging to the category of biological 
productswe employ the word pharmaceutical when referring to the drug industry at large, and biopharmaceutical when 
discussing vaccine-specific issues or other topics related to complex drugs. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VACCINES, BLOOD &
BIOLOGICS, https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics (providing an overview of biologics for regulatory purposes). 
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Predominant economic narratives of intellectual property24 as a system of incentives 
indispensable to innovation have been gradually nuanced in scholarly literature and commentary.25
And while the catalyzing function of intellectual property still drives many discourses in law- and 
policymaking milieus, it is now widely acknowledged that incentives located outside the patent 
and intellectual property ecosystem are necessary to ensure a robust and multi-layered innovation 
policies due to the failure of patents alone in providing robust incentives for technological 
advancements in capital and process-intensive areas such as pharmaceutical discoveries as will be 
explained next.26
B. The Incentives Premise Applied to Pharmaceutical Innovation 
Pharmaceutical markets have long been considered as one of the areas of prime application 
of patent-as-incentives theory.27 Taken as a whole, pharmaceutical R&D tends to occur over 
timelines that are on average considerably longer than in other areas;28 scientific complexity and 
uncertainty often renders R&D processes unpredictable, increasing the risk of failure;29 and the 
industry is heavily regulated, a phenomenon whichwhile not exclusive to the pharmaceutical 
industryfurther increases the cost of R&D.30 As such, the risk of market failurein the form of 
24 See e.g. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 38; Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 
(2005); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
(1969).   
25 See e.g. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? 
Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010) (exploring 
the concept of IP without IP introduced by Mario Biagioli); Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open 
Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017) (describing vaccine R&D processes that do not rely predominantly on IP 
frameworks; Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents - Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in 
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 955, 960-963 (2007) (explaining how Jeffersons intellectual property worldview has 
exerted a strong influence in American jurisprudence, and tracing Jefferson-centric narratives of patent law to the Supreme Courts 
decision in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Benjamin N. Roin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or 
Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005) (analyzing justifications for the patent system rooted in the disclosure of information 
in exchange for a bundle of exclusionary rights); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007) (noting the existence of additional incentives mechanisms elsewhere in the regulatory 
apparatus and the particular role of the Food and Drug Administration as a catalyst for R&D in the pharmaceutical space). See also 
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (critiquing the 
emergence of a particular strand of justifications for intellectual property, known as ex post justifications, and which are based on 
efficient management frameworks and/or the goal of limiting overuse of information). 
26 Infra, Part IV. See also generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L. J. 544 
(2019). 
27 Patent systems across the world have been further tailored in the field of biotechnology. See e.g. Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in 
the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon. 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 441 (2004) (criticizing the Federal Circuits application of patent law 
to biotechnology cases); Ana Nordberg, Economic Justification of Patents and Exceptions to Patentability, 3 NORDIC INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 316 (2012) (examining economic justification for the existence of a different patentability regime for inventions relating 
to methods for treatment and diagnostic methods.) 
28 For instance, in the case of vaccines, the complete R&D arc lasts, on average, over a decade. See e.g. INTL FEDERATION PHARMA.
MANUFACTURERS & ASSN., THE COMPLEX JOURNEY OF A VACCINE (2019), https://www.ifpma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/IFPMA-ComplexJourney-2019_FINAL.pdf; U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, VACCINE 
TESTING AND THE APPROVAL PROCESS (2014), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/basics/test-approve.html (describing the stages of 
vaccine development and regulatory review and approval). 
29 See e.g. Petra Oyston & Karen Robinson, The Current Challenges for Vaccine Development, 61 J. MED. MICROBIOLOGY (2012), 
https://www.microbiologyresearch.org/docserver/fulltext/jmm/61/7/889_jmm039180.pdf?expires=1592349082&id=id&accname
=guest&checksum=CFB0A39DA971F72C04EABE549E6DD5F0 (listing both scientific and financial challenges associated with 
vaccine development). 
30 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LAWS, REGULATIONS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR DRUG APPLICATIONS (2014), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/laws-regulations-policies-and-procedures-drug-applications; Id.,
DEVELOPMENT & APPROVAL PROCESS (CBER) (2019), https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-approval-
process-cber (collectively providing an overview of the regulatory review and approval process to which different types of 
pharmaceutical drugs are subjected before entering the market). 
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underinvestment in socially beneficial R&Dis often depicted as heightened in connection with 
pharmaceutical products than elsewhere in the innovation ecosystem.31
While incentives problems in the pharmaceutical arena are sometimes instrumental to 
justifying the conferral of excessive supra-competitive benefits to the industryincluding lax 
price controls in the United States market32 or cumulative protections within the regulatory 
apparatus33 in this Article we rely on existing literature and policy that is grounded in the 
possibility (and reality) of market failure in pharmaceutical R&D hold true, triggering 
underinvestment and other detrimental consequences to public health.34
Certain types of diseases with small, seasonal or otherwise temporally limited markets have 
long been known not to attract sustained R&D interest and funding from the private sector, often 
relying on support for basic research from the public sector, philanthropic funding, or a 
combination thereof.35 Examples of these diseases include orphan diseases, which in the United 
States defined as affecting fewer than 200,000 patients and include Gehrig's disease, Tourettes 
and rare childhood cancers;36 neglected tropical diseases, and communicable diseases prevalent in 
tropical and sub-tropical climates, which include Chagas disease and Leishmaniasis.37 Many 
vaccine-preventable infectious diseases either overlap with or share many of the market 
characteristics of the previous categories, as further described in the following section.38
These types of diseases are characterized by markets where the misalignment between 
patent incentives to R&D and public health goals is often apparent, with very few players willing 
to engage in R&D,39 absent a catalyst such as a pandemic.  In order to mitigate some of the market 
failures traditionally felt in these areas, many commentators and policymakers have focused on 
other approaches to promoting innovation that rely on non-IP incentives as a complement to 
existing patent frameworks.40
31 For studies on the success rate of pharmaceutical drug discovery see supra note 11 and accompanying text. See generally,  
Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 370 (2007) (stating the government resolves several market failures and preserving the value for drug 
companies); Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (noting regulation spurs innovation by maintaining the value of new drugs.).  
32 See, e.g., Irl B. Hirsch, Insulin in America: A Right or a Privilege? 29 DIABETES SPECTR. 130 (2016) (describing insulin prices 
as skyrocketing in the last decade to the point that patients have been are having difficulty affording insulin.). 
33 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.  
35 Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 8, at 1225 (exploring the temporal limitations of vaccine markets for certain infectious 
diseases). 
36 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RARE DISEASES AT FDA (2020), https://www.fda.gov/patients/rare-diseases-fda; ID., ORPHAN 
PRODUCTS: HOPE FOR PEOPLE WITH RARE DISEASES (2018), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/orphan-
products-hope-people-rare-diseases 
37 WORLD HEALTH ORG., NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES, https://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/; U.S. CTRS.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/ntd/diseases/index.html 
38 Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 8, at 1224-44 (describing the specificities of vaccine R&D surrounding Ebola and 
Zika). Other areas traditionally prone to R&D market failures include antimicrobial resistance. See e.g., Aaron Kesselheim &See 
Kevin Outterson, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POLY, L. & ETHICS (2011); Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic 
Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Global Public Health, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67 (2005).XXX. 
39 Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the Twenty-First Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729, 740-41 (2019) (describing vaccine 
manufacturer attrition from the mid-twentieth century onwards). 
40 See Adrian Towse & Hannah Kettler, A Review of IP and Non-IP Incentives for R&D for Diseases of Poverty. What Type of 
Innovation is Required and How Can We Incentivize the Private Sector to Deliver It?, FINAL REPORT FOR THE WHO COMMISSION 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2005), 
https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/A.Towse.pdf?ua=1; See e.g. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting 
Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying New Financial Incentives to Meeting Public Health Goals, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1689 (2010). 
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C. Limitations of IP Incentives Frameworks: The Case of Vaccines 
From a market-driven perspective, vaccinesor, more precisely, vaccine technology taken 
as a wholeare often considered more prone to market failures for being one of the least appealing 
areas for investment.41 From the viewpoint of funders and R&D players motivated strictly or 
primarily by economic considerations, the prospects of return-on-investment tend to be 
considerably less substantial in the area of vaccines than they are for other types of pharmaceutical 
innovations. 
Unlike existing blockbuster drugs42 or drugs treating mainstream diseases such as heart or 
autoimmune conditions,43 vaccines have several features that inherently hamper 
commercialization and restrict possibilities of monetization. First, they are primarily deployed to 
prevent a transmittable diseasea positive outcome in public health terms, but one whose 
demonstrability and economic impact is much harder to assess, as well as to reconcile with 
squarely for-profit business models.44 As opposed to vaccines, drug treatments are often sold after 
the firm has already obtained ample information on the probability of contracting the disease.45
Second, unlike drugs consumed over long periods of time or in multiple doses, vaccines as a matter 
of fact cannot attract repeat consumers: one dose is frequently enough to generate long-term 
immunity,46 and even when booster doses are required, they are still few and far between.47 Once 
vaccines become widely used and prevent the spread of the disease they reduce demand for the 
product along with revenue breakdown.48 Lastly, although it is socially preferable to prevent 
epidemic, like the Covid-19 we have been witnessing some people choosing, depending on their 
health situation, social exposure, and severity of the disease, to forgo vaccination as part of anti-
vaccine ideology.49 In recent years, we observe anti-vaccination movement of individuals choosing 
41 Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, Why Are Drugs More Profitable Than Vaccines? NBER Working Paper 9833, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9833 (analyzing that while vaccines and drug treatments should yield the same revenues, their model 
is more realistically proving revenue equivalence breaks down for more symmetric information on demand in the case of drugs 
than vaccines).  
42 Rutschman, IP Preparedness, at 1207-1213.  
43 We employ the term mainstream to refer to non-rare diseases. Drugs treating mainstream diseases and generating over $1 
billion in revenue in a single year are known as blockbuster drugs. Examples of these drugs include Lipitor, which lowers 
cholesterol in blood, and Humira, which treats a range of auto-immune conditions. See e.g. Laura, Pfizers Lipitor: The Blockbuster 
Drug That Almost Wasnt, HUFF. POST (Dec. 30, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pfizers-lipitor-the-block_n_1176252; 
Alex Keown, AbbVie Strikes Deal: Blockbuster Humira is Safe Until 2023, BIOSPACE (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.biospace.com/article/abbvie-strikes-deal-with-biogen-blockbuster-humira-is-safe/. 
44 See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170, 173 (2020). See also Liza Vertinsky et al., The Problem with Relying on Profit-Driven Models to 
Produce Pandemic Drugs, _____ (2020). 
45 Kremer & Snyder, supra note 41, at 5.  
46 A few vaccines require repeat or boost dosages due the need to keep up with rapidly adapting viruses to new strands such as 
Influenza (yearly) or vaccines whose effectiveness wanes over time such as Tetanus (boost every decade). See U.S. CTRS. DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, WHAT VACCINES ARE RECOMMENDED FOR YOU (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/adults/rec-
vac/index.html (listing recommend vaccines by age group, including vaccines that do not require booster doses). See also Elizabeth 
Cooney, Most Adults Dont Need Booster Vaccinations for Tetanus and Diphtheria, New Study Concludes, Stat (Feb. 25, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/25/adults-dont-need-booster-vaccinations-for-tetanus-diphtheria-study/; Tetanus Shots 
Needed Every 30 Years, Not Every 10, Say Researchers, SCI. DAILY (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/03/160322133817.htm 
47 Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines, supra note 44, at 173-174. 
48 Kremer & Snyder, supra note 41, at 14. 
49 See Donya Khalili & Arthur Caplan, Off the Grid: Vaccinations Among Homeschooled Children, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 471, 
471 (2007) (discussing the phenomenon in homeschooled children). 
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the risk of catching a disease over vaccinating themselves or their children.50  They prefer to rely 
on their immune systemsome may say free-ride others via herd-immunity rather than paying 
the price (monetary and other) of vaccination.51
These characteristics do not exist in ordinary drugs for diseases that can reoccur or do not 
infect others, and as such, make most vaccines relatively unprofitableand in some cases, as 
described below, outright money-losers.52 The worlds best-selling vaccine, known as Prevnar 13 
targeting pneumococcal disease,53 generated $5.69 billion in revenue in the United States in 2017, 
a number that is projected to increase modestly by 2024 to $5.76 million.54 Gardasil, a vaccine 
targeting the human papillomavirus (HPV),55 came in second in the United States market at $2.38 
billion in 2017, with a projection of $3.28 billion for 2024.56 The fourth and fifth best-selling 
vaccines in 2017 were already under the $2 billion threshold.57 These numbers pertain to the 
worlds largest vaccine market, which registered an overall $27.7 billion in vaccine sales in 2017.58
Smaller markets in the developed world, by contrast, typically register numbers in the single digits: 
in Germany, for example, sales of vaccines generated around $3 billion in 2017.59
While in absolute terms these numbers are significant, contrasting them with revenues 
generated by non-vaccine products puts the vaccine revenue ecosystem in perspective: during the 
same year (2017), the largest-grossing drug in the United States market (Humira) generated $18.43 
billion in revenue, while the second and third best-selling drugs brought in $18.23 billion and 
$8.19 billion, respectively.60 All top-ten best-selling drugs registered over $6 billion in sales 
individually.61 Accordingly, the National Academy of Sciences has reported radical changes over 
the last few decades in the vaccine supply system. While more than 25 private firms produced 
vaccines for the U.S. market in the last 30 years, currently only 5 companies produce all routinely 
recommended vaccines.62
It is also important to note that the majority of vaccines commercially available today 
generate significant lower revenues that the best-selling vaccines alluded to above. Public health 
50 See, e.g., Joanna B. Apolinsky and Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Rethinking Liability for Vaccine Injury, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
537, 543 (2010) (discussing the roots of the anti-vaccine movement opposing compulsory vaccination on grounds of personal 
autonomy as well as fear of injury).  
51 Hillel Y. Levin, Stacie Patrice Kershner, Timothy D. Lytton, Daniel Salmon, & Saad B. Omer, Stopping the Resurgence of 
Vaccine-Preventable Childhood Diseases: Policy, Politics, and Law, 20 U. ILL. L. REV. 233, 245 (2020) (some may argue that the 
burden of maintaining community immunity should be borne by all people in society equally, especially since those who choose 
not to vaccinate free-ride on those who do, through the protections afforded by community immunity.).  
52 See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
53 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PNEUMOCOCCAL CONJUGATE (PCV13) VIS (2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/vis-statements/pcv13.html 
54 Matej Mikulic, Top 5 Global Vaccine Products Based on Revenue in 2017 and 2024, STATISTA (Jul. 22, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/314566/leading-global-vaccine-products-by-revenue/ 
55 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HUMAN PAPILLOMAVIRUS (HPV) VACCINE (2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/vaccines/hpv-vaccine.html 




60 Mark Terry, Drum Roll, Please! Top 10 Bestselling Drugs in the U.S., BIOSPACE (May 21, 2028), 
https://www.biospace.com/article/drumroll-please-top-10-bestselling-drugs-in-the-u-s-/. See also Ana Santos Rutschman, 
Regulatory Malfunctions in the Drug Patent Ecosystem, 70 EMORY L. J. __ (2020) (explaining how the biologic drug Humira has 
continued to be commercialized under monopolistic market conditions in the United States, even though Humiras patent estate 
began disintegrating in 2016). 
61 See Terry, supra note 60.  
62 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY 1 (Natl Academies 
Press, 2004) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221816/ (reporting severe erosion in the private vaccine supply system).  
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authorities, in consultation with scientific experts, issue timelines for recommended vaccination 
such as the schedules issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the 
United States.63 Vaccines listed in these official vaccination schedules enjoy relatively stable 
markets, with predictable and sustained demand over time. Nevertheless, even these routinely 
scheduled vaccines enjoy modest economic returns within the pharmaceutical universe. Vaccines 
that are not listed as routine immunizations in the official childhood and adult schedules tend to 
fare even worse in terms of market performance.64 This is the case of vaccines needed when there 
is an outbreak of infectious diseases that are (or used to be) infrequent in countries in the Global 
North, such as the Ebola outbreak in 2014-16 and the Zika outbreak in 2015-16.65 In both cases, 
the technology needed to produce vaccine candidates had already been developed or was easily 
(and inexpensively) adaptable from pre-existing vaccines in the same viral family.66 And yet, 
before the outbreak suddenly and temporarily spiked demand for these vaccines, R&D on these 
vaccines had come to a standstill.67 In the case of the Ebola outbreak, the vaccine candidate literally 
sat on a shelf in the years leading up to the outbreak, failing to attract interest from the private 
sector.68
Following these outbreaks, and in response to a widely recognized lack of sufficient levels 
of R&D in the vaccine space, the first international public-private partnership dedicated to support 
vaccine R&D in especially underfunded areasthe Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness 
Innovations or CEPIemerged.69 CEPIs preliminary business plan, drafted the year before the 
partnership was launched, clearly stated that the vaccines for which CEPI would be providing 
funding were not expected to turn a significant profit.70
The specific characteristics of vaccines as commodified goodsin particular the limited 
number of potential users and usesmake patents a poor default system of incentives to R&D in 
this area. The dynamics of vaccine R&D models structured around IP incentives are thus often in 
tension with public health imperatives, which prescribe preparedness and affordability through a 
robust and continuous R&D.  
Moreover, and considering that vaccines are consensually regarded as one of the most cost-
effective means of preventing a disease and lessening its burden, underinvestment in vaccine R&D 
also produces significant undesirable economic effects. Lacking or insufficient vaccine R&D is 
63 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULES (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/index.html 
64 See Ana Santos Rutschman, Property and Intellectual Property in Vaccine Markets, TEXAS A&M U. J. PROP. L. (forthcoming 
2020), draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3590912. 
65 See generally Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 8. 
66 Id., at 1224-43. 
67 See Denise Grady, Ebola Vaccine, Ready for Test, Sat on the Shelf, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/health/without-lucrative-market-potential- 
ebola-vaccine-was-shelved-for-years.html 
68 Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 8, at 1221.  
69 CEPI, OUR MISSION, https://cepi.net/about/whyweexist/. See also Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines, supra note 
44. 
70 CEPI, PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN, 2017-2021 (November 2016), (on file with author), at 12 (further establishing that [i]n the 
event that a vaccine developed with CEPI support does develop economic value, agreements between CEPI and the vaccine 
developer will ensure either that CEPIs investment is reimbursed or that the economic value is shared through royalties or other 
risk sharing agreements.). 
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bound to result in (temporally delayed) costs to health systems dealing with outbreaks of vaccine-
preventable diseases while slowing economic growth and upsetting employment.71
The patent system, in its transversal and largely technology-agnostic architecture,72 has so 
far proved a poor catalyst for vaccine R&D, especially in the case of neglected or orphan 
diseases.73 As such, predominant R&D models, which remain patent-centric,74 have historically 
led to a scenario of pronounced underinvestment in the development of new vaccines.75 This is 
true even in cases in which the technology needed to produce new vaccines is largely pre-existing 
or relatively easy to develop from a scientific and technical perspective. In public health terms, 
this market failure translates into sub-optimal preparedness levels for outbreaks caused by 
emerging pathogensmany of which are known to the scientific community and expected to cause 
severe outbreaks in the short-term.76 The next Part will discuss the flaws of other non-IP incentives 
in increasing levels of, and resolving underinvestment in, vaccine research.  
III. NON-IP INCENTIVES FRAMEWORKS IN THE VACCINE SPACE
The idea of non-patent incentives has co-existed with patent frameworks from the inception 
of the patent system in the United States.77 Fritz Machlup and several other researchers have traced 
the idea of non-patent incentives in the United States back to James Madisons proposal of a 
premium system as the primary mechanism to encourage and reward innovation.78
71 The U.S. economy suffered its biggest blow since the Great Depression in the second quarter as the COVID-19 pandemic. Lucia 
Mutikani, Covid-19 Crushes U.S. Economy in Second Quarter; Rising Virus Cases Loom Over Recovery, BUS. NEWS (JUL. 30, 
2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy/covid-19-crushes-us-economy-in-second-quarter-rising-virus-cases-
loom-over-recovery-idUSKCN24V0FO. See also Paul Davidson, US Economy Contracted Record 32.9% in Q2 Amid State 
Shutdowns, Covid-19 Contagion Fears, USA TODAY (Jul. 30, 2020) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/07/30/economy-gdp-fell-annual-rate-32-9-q-2-amid-covid-19-crisis/5536647002/ 
(describing economic aftermath of Covid-19 closures).  
72 On the topic of whether the patent system should be regarded as technology-agnostic or technology-specific, see generally Dan 
L. Burk & Mark Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific? 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J., 1155 (2002). 
73 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, ORPHAN PRODUCTS: HOPE FOR PEOPLE WITH RARE DISEASES (2018), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-
information-consumers/orphan-products-hope-people-rare-diseases  
74 Vaccine R&D as a whole now takes place in much more patent-dense environment than in the early and mid-twentieth century, 
the so-called golden age of vaccine innovation. See Rutschman, supra note 39 at 730. The COVID-19 vaccine race also illustrates 
this point, with concerns over the exclusionary power emerging during the early stages of the pandemic. See e.g. Jennifer Hillman, 
Drugs and Vaccines Are ComingBut to Whom?, FOREIGN AFF. (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-05-19/drugs-and-vaccines-are-coming-whom 
75 Kremer & Snyder, supra note 41, at 14 (citing private companies finding vaccines less financially rewarding than drugs.). See 
also Frederick Chena & Flavio Toxvaerd, The Economics of Vaccination, 263 J. THEO. BIO. 105, 106 (2014) (noting that the market 
for vaccinations is widely believed to be characterized by market failures but demonstrate conditions in which equilibrium non-
optimality may be obtained).  
76 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 10, at 6 and 22 (providing an initial list of diseases to be urgently addressed as compiled by 
the World Health Organization after its assessment of a systemic lack of R&D preparedness for emerging pathogens). As the 
World Organization noted with regard to the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak, [t]here were no vaccines, no treatments, few diagnostics, 
and insufficient medical teams and trained responders. Id. at 6. 
77 Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No.15 of Comm. on Judiciary, Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., (1958), at 15 (noting that [p]roposals for systems of prizes and bonuses to 
inventors, as alternatives to patents, are almost as old as the patent system). 
78 Id., ib. See also generally Craig A. Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 2 
REV. L. & ECON. 223 (2006); Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 909 (2002). 
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Today, they have come to be understood as complementary innovation levers alongside the 
patent system,79 playing an important role in the R&D incentives landscape.80 In a 2013 study, 
Daniel Hemel and Lisa Ouellette examined the funding apparatus of the federal government in the 
United States, calculating that current annual federal spending on innovation incentives is $130
$140 billion for grants, well under $0.1 billion for prizes, about $10 billion for R&D tax credits.81
In this section, we provide an overview of non-patent incentives to R&D, with an emphasis 
on pharmaceutical R&D. Given the particularities of vaccine R&D, we turn to specific 
embodiments of non-patent incentives relating to vaccines. This section illustrates that even non-
patent initiatives have many shortcomings that highlight the importance of greater reconsideration 
of tax-based incentives for vaccine R&D. 
A. Grants 
As noted in the previous section, the Federal government disburses the overwhelming 
majority of R&D funding through the grant system.82 The current preference for the grant model 
has been criticized on several accounts,83 with some commentators suggesting that incentives 
mechanisms operating ex post, such as prizes, should absorb a greater share of public funding.84
As Nicholson Price explains, criticism of the grant system unfolds primarily in three 
strands: it leads to poor allocative decisions as grantors lack market-value knowledge possessed 
by private firms; the ex-ante nature of grant funding reduces accountability parameters; and risk 
is distributed unevenly and suboptimally between grantor and grantee.85
In his analysis of grants administered by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Price 
nonetheless concludes that the inefficiencies traditionally observed with grant funding might not 
be as severe as often portrayed.86 His study emphasizes the peer review process to which allocative 
decisions are subjected to; formal and informal accountability mechanisms, such as reporting 
mechanisms and reputational concerns for repeat applicants; and that the risk shouldered by the 
granting institution, often translates into valuable social benefits, including the disclose of 
confidential negative knowledge surrounding the invention.87
In the field of vaccines, and in spite of the blurred terminology, one of the most prestigious 
awardsthe Michelson Prizeis in fact a grant. It is awarded to investigators under 35 years old 
79 See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Innovation System?, 2 INNOVATION 
POLY & ECON. 51 (2002); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 
1001-1002 (2014); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 
(2001) 
80 Hemel & Ouellette, infra note 26, at 545. See also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference 
to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2013) (noting that in spite of the relevance of government funding we still lack any 
clear theory or good comparative empirical analyses from which to determine the best form of deploying such massive amounts of 
government money). 
81 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the PatentsPrizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 361 (2013). Hemel and 
Ouellette further note that several states also provide R&D funding for universities and other research facilities. Id. at 321. It is 
worth noting that federal funding for R&D has decreased since Hemel and Ouellettes study. See e.g. Heidi Ledford et al., Trump 
Seeks Big Cuts to Science Funding  Again, NATURE (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00719-4 
82 Supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
83 See generally W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 6 (2019) (reviewing the grant system in the U.S.). 
84 See e.g. Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (making the case for a shift in government funding from climate change-related research from grants 
to prizes). See also Love & Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, infra note XX and accompanying text. 
85 Price, supra note 83, at 6. 
86 Price, supra note 83, at 7. 
87 Price, supra note 83, at 7. 
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who are applying disruptive concepts and inventive processes to advance human immunology, 
vaccine discovery, and immunotherapy research across major global diseases.88 The Human 
Vaccines Project, a decade-long, transnational and multi-party research project modeled after the 
Human Genome Project,89 was created partly as a response to the growing scientific and 
infrastructural challenges in immunology and vaccine R&D.90 Its goal is to accelerate R&D on 
new vaccines, alongside diagnostics and treatments.91
While highly prestigious and relevant in the scientific discipline(s) it covers, the Michelson 
Prize also speaks to the general limitations of prize models. The awards are made to individuals as 
opposed to research projects, and their amount$150,000 as of the 2020 edition92is far from 
substantial. One of its principal fundersthe Human Vaccines Projectwas designed as a decade-
long research partnership (like the Human Genome Project before it), which means that the prize 
itself is to some extent conditioned by the existence of, and funding for, the awarding entity. While 
there is nothing inherently wrong with temporally limited award formats, they speak to the small-
scale nature of much of the funding available to vaccine R&D. These limitations further illustrate 
a greater need for incentives that work with market-driven approaches, such as the framework we 
propose for tax-based incentives in Part V. 
Within the realm of public-sector funding, grants from federal agencies acting in the public 
health sphere have traditionally played an important role in supporting vaccine R&D.93 As of June 
2020, for instance, there were 26 open grant funding opportunity announcements from the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID).94 In addition to regular support for vaccine 
R&D through its grant systems, NIAID, National Institute of Health (NIH) and other federal 
agencies also provide funding during public health crises like COVID-19.95 Yet, while the total 
amount of federal grants offered to pharmaceutical innovations is considerable, the amount granted 
to vaccine awardee is not significant enough to tilt the scale towards investments in vaccine 
research compared to mainstream pharmaceutical and technological innovations in the pre-
pandemic setting.  
B. Prizes 
Even though they receive only a small fraction of public-sector funding,96 incentives 
systems based on prizes have long enjoyed favor among many commentators looking for 
88 HUMAN VACCINES PROJECT, ABOUT THE MICHELSON PRIZES, https://www.humanvaccinesproject.org/michelsonprizes/ 
89 Id., ib. See also U.S. INST. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-
project 
90 HUMAN VACCINES PROJECT, supra note 88.
91 Id., ib.
92 Id., ib.
93 See U.S. NATL INST. ALLERGY & INFECT. DISEASES, VACCINES (2017), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/vaccines (providing 
an overview of NIAIDs role in funding vaccine R&D); Id., FUNDING OPPORTUNITY FOCUSES ON INNOVATIVE VACCINE RESEARCH
(2017), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/grants-contracts/funding-opportunity-focuses-innovative-vaccine-research (listing funding 
opportunities for vaccine R&D in the HIV space); Id., NEW R01 AND R21 FUNDING OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT UNIVERSAL 
INFLUENZA VACCINE RESEARCH (2018), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/grants-contracts/universal-influenza-vaccine-research-foa 
(listing funding opportunities for vaccine R&D for a universal flu vaccine). 
94 NATL INST. ALLERGY & INFECT. DISEASES, OPPORTUNITIES & ANNOUNCEMENTS (2020), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/grants-
contracts/opportunities?combine=vaccine&search=vaccine (last visited May 30, 2020). 
95 See e.g. MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES, BARDA AND SANOFI PREPARE FOR STUDIES OF COVID-19 VACCINE, 
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/newsroom/2020/psc-sanofi-recombinant/. For example, the NIH so far awarded grants 
totaled $6.9 billion for Covid-19 related research. NIH, Grants Funded Under Special COVID-19 Appropriations, 
https://projectreporter.nih.gov/reporter_SearchResults.cfm?icde=50791251. 
96 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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complementary levers to intellectual property in innovation policy.97 Before intellectual property 
grew into the default incentives regime for scientific and technical innovation, prizes were used 
more often across different fields of science.98 Perhaps the most famous example is that of prizes 
offered in the eighteenth century by several European countriesmost notably by the United 
Kingdom for solutions to the then-unsolved problem of how to reliably measure longitude at 
sea.99
Today, examples of prizes for technical and scientific innovation can be found in the 
public100 and private101 sectors alike. At the conceptual level, they are often proposed as sets of 
large-scale rewards for success in the high-cost, high-risk area of pharmaceutical R&D,102
although in practice relatively few mega-prizes exist.  
As noted by several commentators and synthesized by Hemel and Ouellette, the prize 
system, even in its complementary function within the innovation ecosystem, is not immune to 
problems and inefficiencies.103 If set by the government, prizes are subject to risks of 
politicization, rent-seeking, and mismanagement.104 Moreover, because the sum and terms of the 
rewards are set ex ante, prizes are also subject to problems of under- and over-evaluation.105 And, 
as noted below in connection with incentives for vaccine R&D, prizes set by institutions in both 
the public and the private sectors are subject to budgetary and other financial constraints. 
Consequently, prizes proper are much more infrequently deployed in vaccine innovation 
systems.106 They are nonetheless routinely theorized both by scholars and outside academia.107
Most recently, they have been proposed as a way to bolster R&D on COVID-19 vaccines while 
the pandemic unfolds. In an allusion to the longitude prizes described in Part III.A.2,108 Chris 
Callaghan has suggested a Longitude Prize for COVID-19 vaccines of many billions of 
pounds that would be funded through contributions collected by the World Health Organization 
or the United Nations.109 Hemel and Ouellette have proposed a large cash prize for the successful 
97 See e.g. Roin, Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, supra note 79; Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 976 (2012); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Michael Kremer 
& Heidi Williams, Incentivizing Innovation: Adding to the Tool Kit, 10 INNOVATION POLY & ECON. 1 (2010); 
98 Roin, supra note 79; Kapczynski, The Cost of Price, supra note 97, at 973. 
99 LONGITUDE PRIZE, THE HISTORY, HTTPS://LONGITUDEPRIZE.ORG/CHALLENGE/HISTORY
100 See e.g. U.S. OFFICE SCI. & TECH., IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL PRIZE AUTHORITY: FISCAL YEAR 2015 PROGRESS REPORT 
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/fy2015_competes_prizes_report.pdf (describing greater public-
sector investment in inducement prizes). 
101 See e.g. Alan MacCormack et al., Spurring Innovation Through Competitions, MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REV. (Sept. 17, 2013), 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/spurring-innovation-through-competitions/ (describing the 2010 Progressive Insurance 
Automotive X-Prize, awarding $10 million to the development of a vehicle with breakthrough energy efficiency). 
102 See e.g., Bruce G. Charlton, Mega-prizes in Medicine: Big Cash Awards May Stimulate Useful and Rapid Therapeutic 
Innovation, 68 MED. HYPOTHESES 1 (2007), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17052861/ 
103 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 81, at 326. 
104 Id. at 327.  
105 Id., ib.
106 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
107 See James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANN. HEALTH L. 155 (2009) 
(proposing four possible embodiments of prize models for vaccines and other types of drug). 
108 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. The allusion further references the revival of the Longitude Prize in the United 
Kingdom in 2014. See Jon White, Astronomer Royal: Why We Need a New Longitude Prize, NEW SCIENTIST (May 19, 2014), 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25589-astronomer-royal-why-we-need-a-new-longitude-prize/ 
109 Chris Callaghan, Would a Longitude Prize Speed Production of a Covid-19 Vaccine?, WORLD U. RANKINGS (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/would-longitude-prize-speed-production-covid-19-vaccine 
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development of any vaccine targeting COVID-19, conditioning payment of the prize to the 
requirement that the firm makes the vaccine available to patients at low or zero cost.110
While greater attention and resources directed towards vaccine R&D is desirable
particularly when it bolsters already extraordinary manifestations of goodwill in the vaccine R&D 
space, as it happens during a pandemicprizes offered as a public health crisis unfolds are an 
intrinsically limited incentives mechanism. Outbreak-spiked funding for vaccine R&D has 
historically been short-lived and limited by shifting financial dynamics and the political 
economy.111 In addition to implementation constraints, proposals like Callaghans also have to 
contend with institutional limitations, as illustrated by the ways in which criticism of the World 
Health Organization has affected its operative and reputational power during COVID-19.112
Moreover, prizes created during large-scale public health crises constitute, at best, remedial 
approaches. While Hemel and Ouellettes proposal would potentially solve affordability issues 
hovering over emerging coronavirus vaccines113which can also be addressed in other forms by 
the legal system114they do not address the fundamental shortcomings of incentives to vaccine 
R&D before an outbreak takes place. Without any meaningful prize system in place, a few months 
into the COVID-19 pandemic there were well over one hundred different vaccine R&D projects,115
as well as over than two hundred drugs being considered for therapeutic purposes.116 Alas, patents, 
grants, and prizes have not been successful in instigating similar interest in vaccine R&D in the 
pre-crisis setting.   
C. Other Types of Incentives: Regulatory Ad Hoc Incentives and Reimbursement Schemes 
A strand of legal literature focusing on innovation law and policy has progressively added 
to the traditional roster of non-patent incentives that operate specifically in pharmaceutical R&D. 
Following her 2007 account of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as an information-
production agency, Rebecca Eisenberg has identified different ways in which the Agency plays a 
catalyzing role in pharmaceutical innovation policy.117 These include the awarding of market and 
110 Daniel Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Want a Coronavirus Vaccine, Fast? Heres a Solution, TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 4, 
2020).  
111 Rutschman, IP Preparedness, at 1225 (noting how outbreak-spiked funding is often lost on short-lived R&D projects and tends 
to shrink fairly quickly). 
112 See e.g. Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: WHO Has Stumbled Repeatedly in Communicating About the 
Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Jun. 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-
202/2020/06/10/the-health-202-who-has-stumbled-repeatedly-in-communicating-about-the-
coronavirus/5edfc29d602ff12947e88660/; Paul LeBlanc, Fauci Voices Support for World Health Organization After Trump 
Terminates US Relationship, CNN (Jun. 11, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/11/politics/fauci-world-health-organization-
coronavirus/index.html 
113 See Ed Silverman, Azar Has a Tin Ear When it Comes to Pricing a Potential Coronavirus Treatment, STAT (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/27/azar-coronavirus-affordable-trump/. 
114 See generally Sapna Kumar, Patents, Pharma, and the Pandemic (on file with authors). See also Hannah Brennan et al., A 
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH (2017).   
115 By mid-June 2020, some sources put the number of vaccine-specific COVID-19 R&D projects around 130, while others reported 
over 160 projects. WORLD HEALTH ORG., DRAFT LANDSCAPE OF COVID-19 CANDIDATE VACCINES (Jun. 9, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/draft-landscape-of-covid-19-candidate-vaccines; Jonathan Corum & Carl Zimmer, 
Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Jun. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/science/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker.html  
116 MILKEN INST., COVID-19 TRACKER, 
https://airtable.com/shrSAi6t5WFwqo3GM/tblEzPQS5fnc0FHYR/viweyymxOAtNvo7yH?blocks=bipZFzhJ7wHPv7x9z (listing 
over 230 R&D projects as of June 10, 2020). 
117 Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 346. 
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data exclusivities to first market-entrants,118 which prevent the FDA from approving follow-on 
drugs for certain periods of time,119 thus conferring a de facto monopoly-like position to drug 
manufacturers who gain FDA approval for first-of-its-kind drugs. Market and data exclusivities 
are independent of the status of patent protection.120 Yaniv Heled, who has emphasized how these 
FDA-administered exclusivities constitute regulatory competitive shelters,121 has also noted that 
these types of exclusivities are limited almost exclusively to FDA regulation,122 reflecting how 
pharmaceutical R&D players can take advantage of (and even abuse) some forms of incentives 
that are not available in other technical and scientific areas.123
Still at the FDA level, another type of incentive mechanism is the priority review voucher 
system,124 which was established to encourage pharmaceutical companies to engage in R&D on 
traditionally underfunded diseases by offering a voucher to sponsors of novel drugs in this area 
who successfully obtain FDA market approval.125 The voucher can then be redeemed to expedite 
regulatory review of an unrelated drugin practice, a drug targeting a mainstream disease126by 
the same sponsor, or sold to a competitor.127 The system covers vaccine-preventable infectious 
diseases like Ebola and Zika, as well as other neglected tropical diseases.128 The transferability 
option of the voucher system naturally has made it highly susceptible to gamesmanship and abuse 
by pharmaceutical companies that obtain vouchers in underfunded R&D but utilize the special 
expedited review in R&D of unrelated profitable drugs.  
Elsewhere in the administrative state, Rachel Sachs and others have made the case that 
insurance reimbursement, such as through the Medicare129 and Medicaid130 programs, should also 
be considered. They demonstrated such insurance programs can serve as a form of incentive to 
pharmaceutical R&D by promising consistent demand (albeit at lower prices) for vaccines.  
118 There are also market exclusivities available to some follow-on innovators. Follow-on innovators can be either sponsors of 
generic versions of small-molecule drugs, or sponsors of biosimilar versions of large-molecule drugs. 
119 Supra note 118 (defining follow-on innovators). 
120 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVITY (2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/frequently-asked-questions-patents-and-exclusivity 
121 Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (2015). 
122 Id. ib.
123 For a critique of (overly) cumulative layers of incentives in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical space, see e.g. Yaniv 
Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals - Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 419 (2012). 
124 See David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 313, (2006) (proposing the voucher 
system). 
125 See e.g. Alexander Gaffney et al., REGULATORY EXPLAINER: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT FDAS PRIORITY REVIEW 
VOUCHERS, REG. AFF. PROFESSIONALS SOCY (2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/07/02/21722/Regulatory-
Explainer- Everything-You-Need-to-Know-About-FDA%E2%80%99s-Priority-Review-Vouchers/. 
126 See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: From Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st 
Century Cures Act, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 71 (2017) (critiquing the implementation of the voucher system). 
127 See e.g. Chelsey Dulaney, United Therapeutics Sells Priority-Review Voucher to AbbVie for $350 Million, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
19, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/united-therapeutics-sells-priority-review-voucher-to-abbvie-for-350-million-
1439981104; Richard Staines, Priority Review Voucher Prices Fall Again After Sparks $110m Sale, PHARMAPHORUM (May 1, 
2018), https://pharmaphorum.com/news/spark-sells-priority-review-voucher-to-jazz/ (noting the progressive after the record set in 
2015). 
128 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/72569/download 
129 Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 NYU L. REV. 75 (2020). 
130 Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 153 (2016). 
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Similarly, other federal programs such as the Vaccines for Children Program (VFC) 
enable the CDC to buy recommended vaccines at discount prices.131 These vaccines are then made 
available through state, local and territorial health departments or agencies to VFC providers at no 
cost for eligible populations.132 The VFC program covers Medicaid-eligible, uninsured and 
underinsured children, as well as American Indian and Alaska Native children. The program is 
restricted to childhood vaccines recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices,133 which constitutes the backbone of official vaccination schedules.134 Vaccines 
typically needed during a pandemicwhich tend to align with the spectrum of diseases 
traditionally placed under the umbrella of neglected tropical diseases or other types of neglected 
diseasesfall outside the VFC program. Similarly, some adult vaccines are covered by state 
Medicaid programs,135 but coverage is significantly more limited when compared to the VFC 
program.136
At the international level, there are procurement mechanisms to buy and distribute vaccines 
in developing countries.137 Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, a public-private partnership created in 
2000, is the largest and leading institution in this field, sourcing multilateral funding for, and 
assisting in the distribution of, different types of vaccines across low- and middle-income 
countries.138 Currently, Gavi supports in varying ways 17 different types of vaccines.139 Some of 
these are childhood vaccines, such as the Measles-Rubella vaccines, while others target 
traditionally underfunded diseases, such as the Typhoid and oral Cholera vaccines.140 Alas, these 
collaboration initiatives provide limited profit opportunities (if any) to participant pharmaceutical 
firms.  
To summarize this Part, the disjunction between public health needs and business models 
dependent on the monetization of patent rights, coupled with the relative paucity of the current 
non-IP incentives landscape as applied to vaccines are not free of inefficiencies themselves. 
Underinvestment in vaccine R&D remains a significant hurdle at the present time. This prompts 
us to consider the possibility of exploring underused levers in the non-IP incentives landscape. 
Next, we explore the role of tax incentives for spurring investment in innovation in the 
pharmaceutical, and specifically, vaccine research domain.   
131 U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, VACCINES FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM (VFC) (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/index.html 
132 U.S. MEDICAID, QUALITY OF CARE VACCINES, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/quality-of-care/quality-improvement-
initiatives/quality-of-care-vaccines/index.html 
133 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices Policies and Procedures (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/committee/downloads/Policies-Procedures-508.pdf 
134 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE (2013), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/patient-ed/conversations/downloads/vacsafe-child-immun-bw-office.pdf 
135 See QUALITY OF CARE VACCINES, supra note 132. 
136 See generally Sara Rosenbaum et al., The Epidemiology of U.S. Immunization Law: Medicaid Coverage of Immunizations for 
Non-institutionalized Adults, NATL IMMUNIZATIONS PROGRAM REPORT (2003), 
https://publichealth.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/DHP_Publications/pub_uploads/dhpPublication_5F6FC614-5056-9D20-
3D48DB884F5C18C8.pdf, at 6. 
137 See GAVI, A ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE: COUNTRY-OWNED DECISIONS IN VACCINE PROCUREMENT, 
https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/document/country-owned-decisions-roadmap---public-summarypdf.pdf (defining vaccine 
procurement as the set of several steps and considerations that ultimately result in vaccines being purchased and delivered into 
the hands of a country government for distribution and immunization among its people). 
138 GAVI, https://www.gavi.org 
139 GAVI, VACCINE SUPPORT, https://www.gavi.org/programmes-impact/types-support/vaccine-support 
140 Id. ib.
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3732567
19  TAX POLICY & PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 2020  
19
IV. CURRENT TAX INCENTIVES FOR DOMESTIC PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
We turn our attention here to the role of tax law and policy for two reasons: first, within 
the pharmaceutical innovation literatureand, more broadly, within the legal literaturetax-
based incentives have received far less attention than other incentives frameworks. Second, and 
more important, reliance on the tax system offers a significant advantage over other types of non-
IP incentives, which require greater shares of ex ante financing for the incentive to be disbursed 
and passed along to R&D players. While set by the public sector, tax incentives create an enabling 
framework that is self-incorporated by private-sector players and investors. In this sense, they 
constitute a public policy tool that takes advantage of market forces and market actors, rather than 
deriving funding from pre-existing, limited budgets. 
In focusing on tax law and policy in this Part and the next, our point is not that tax-based 
incentives are preferable or comparatively superior to other forms of non-patent incentives. Rather, 
we argue that tax incentives have been underused or used inefficiently to stimulate R&D in 
vaccines and underfunded diseases areas. We contend that tax incentives can be tailored in more 
creative ways to further innovation policy goals in vaccine R&D, in particular those that are closely 
aligned with the pursuit of public health imperatives.  
At present, there are several tax apparatuses that are available for companies conducting 
research, including but not limited to, pharmaceutical research. Immediate Expensing for R&D 
provides a faster way to recover the cost of investment in innovation. The Research and 
Experimentation credit (R&D credit)141 offers companies a direct reduction in their tax bills in 
return for increasing spending on in-house research. The Basic Research credit ensures that 
companies benefit from outsourcing scientific investigations and collaborating with universities. 
The Orphan Drug Credit aims to alleviate some of the development costs of drugs for rare diseases 
at the clinical-trial phase. Finally, Patent Donations provide a charitable deduction for intellectual 
property donated to nonprofit organizations.142
As this Part will reveal, these tax incentives are complex and costly and, thus, may not 
significantly modify the nature of the industry, particularly not in the context of vaccine 
development. Moreover, while they might contribute to the growth of private research enterprise, 
they have been criticized for mainly rewarding large firms, that may abuse the benefits, and spike 
drug prices and insurance premiums.143
A. Immediate R&D Expensing  
It is a basic rule in tax law that the costs of doing business incurred while creating or 
developing an asset with useful life extending beyond the taxable year are capitalized and 
depreciated.144 Nevertheless, added in 1954, section 174 of the Tax Code provides taxpayers with 
141 In this paper, we use the term "research and development" and "research and experimentation" interchangeably although the 
latter is more restrictive than the former and does not necessarily specific immediate commercial applications. The term research 
and experimentation tracks back to immediate expensing under § 174. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. 
Peroni, R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse?, 69 TAX L. REV. 419, 422 n.15 (2016).  
142 We focus here on tax provisions relating to pharmaceutical innovation and do not examine other tax provisions that relate to the 
intersection of tax, IP, and R&D including depreciation of computer software, amortization of copyrights, selling or exchanging 
patents or other IP to foreign corporations, etc. See generally Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
2229, 2267-77 (2014) (referencing extensive literature on taxation of intangibles); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity 
and Efficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1-8 (2010) (reviewing and criticizing tax rules relating to 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks).    
143 See infra notes 202-208 and accompanying text.  
144 26 U.S.C. §§167, 263.  
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a faster way to recover their costs relating to research and development.145 Companies can elect to 
immediately deduct certain research and experimentation costs or capitalize them over a period of 
510 years.146 Because inflation diminishes the value of moneyalong with the axiom that a dollar 
saved today is worth more than a dollar saved in the futuremost taxpayers will prefer to deduct 
expenses immediately rather than incrementally depreciate them over a number of years. Yet, 
companies with substantial short-term losses such as small and startup companies with no positive 
income to offset against the deduction will likely not benefit as much from this tax incentive and 
choose to defer the R&D deduction to later years.147 Still, the Joint Committee on Taxation 
estimated that in 2020, the federal government will lose $2.5 billion in tax revenue due to early 
expensing for R&D mostly by larger and established firms.148
The Tax Code defines qualified research and experimentation expenses eligible for 
expensing as those used for testing in the exploratory or lab setting related to the development or 
improvement of a product.149 A product is defined for those purposes as including any pilot, model, 
process, formula, method, patent, etc.150 To qualify as eligible for immediate expensing, the 
expenditure is categorized according to the nature of its related activity, not just the idea or the 
product. For example, wages of employees engaged in R&D, expenses to update and maintain 
research facilities, supplies utilized for experimentation or trials, and administrative guidance or 
computer software used in the research process are by their nature expenses that normally qualify 
when they relate to developing or improving a product.151 Yet, there are also expenses specifically 
disallowed even if they are part of developing or improving a product, such as acquisition of 
patents, models, production or process, advertising or promotions, quality control testing, and 
effectiveness or consumer surveys.152 The acquisition or improvement of land or of depreciable or 
depletable property also is not eligible for R&D expensing.153 As discussed above, research 
expenses cannot be claimed twice, thus expenses deducted immediately under section 174 are 
reduced by the amount of the R&D credit. 
Scholars have debated altogether the efficiency of immediate expensing and accelerated 
capital recovery policies in furthering government goals to generate economic stimulus by 
increasing the positive net present value of certain capital investments.154 Some have argued that 
expensingas a general rule not just for R&Drepresents bad tax policy and hefty subsidy for 
investments without special public merit.155 Others have noted expensing encourages a waste of 
capital by promoting investments that absence the tax benefit would not have been made.156
145 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 66 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 174). 
146 26 U.S.C. §174(a), (b).  
147 Id. 26 U.S.C. §§174(f)(2), 59(e). Moreover, some companies might choose to defer the deduction in order to mitigate the effect 
of the alternative minimum tax adjustment for research expenditures. 26 U.S.C. §56(b)(2).  
148 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 114th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2019-2023, at 
tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2019); US Department of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures, available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
issues/tax-policy/tax-
expenditures#:~:text=Tax%20expenditures%20are%20defined%20by,exceptions%20may%20be%20viewed%20as. 
149 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) and (2).   
150 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(11). 
151 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2. 
152 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(6).   
153 26 U.S.C. §174(c).    
154 See e.g., Rebecca N. Morrow, Accelerating Depreciation in Recession, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 465, 488-90 (2016) (arguing data is 
mixed on whether these policies achieved this intent).  
155
156 See e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalize Costs of Software Development, 124 TAX NOTES 603, 612 (2009) (calling for the 
elimination of 100% expensing). 
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In the recent tax reform introduced by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act the government abruptly 
eliminated R&D expensing starting 2021.157 In the following years, amounts paid or incurred for 
research or experimental expenditures must be capitalized and amortized ratably over five years.158
Legal academics Xuan-Thao Nguyen and Jeffrey Maine criticized these sudden changes in tax 
policy claiming they were made without proper notice or legislative reasoning.159 They warned 
such disruptive changes threaten the future of innovation in the United States as to drive research 
and innovation activities offshore to Europe and China.160
B. Tax Credits for Increasing Research Activities and Basic Research 
In 1981, Congress added section 41 to the Tax Code as a temporary research credit to 
stimulate private research and development and reverse a decline in research activities conducted 
in the private sector during those years.161 The R&D credit benefited from wide bipartisan support 
and endorsement by prominent leaders from the high-tech, integrated circuits, 
telecommunications, and computer industries.162 Accordingly, over several decades, it endured 
multiple renewals, extensions, and retroactive extensions until it became permanent in 2015.163
Although not geared specifically towards pharmaceutical firms, it certainly can be, and has been, 
claimed by such companies.164
As its title specifies, the R&D credit applies only to incremental research expenditures, 
aiming to incentivize firms to increase their average R&D expenses rather than rewarding them 
for R&D expenditures they have incurred regardless of any credit. To achieve this ambitious 
endeavor, the R&D credit provides a dollar-per-dollar reduction against the tax imposed up to 20 
percent of the amount of their qualified research expenses165 over a base amount.166 Such 
expenses include, for example, wages paid to research employees and supplies used in research. 
Such costs can be considered qualified research expenses under the credit if they are incurred for 
the purpose of discovering information that is technological in nature in the development of a new 
157 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.  See also Jacob Puhl, Brady Doubles Down on 100 Percent 
Expensing at Ways and Means Hearing, DELOITTE (May 19, 2017), http://newsletters.usdbriefs.com/2017/Tax/TNV/170519_ 
1.pdf. 
158 26 U.S.C. § 174(a)(1)-(2) (2020).  
159 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Attacking Innovation, 99 B.U.L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2019) (warning against recent 
changes in U.S. patent system, a decline in direct funding of research, and a weakening of tax policy tools used to encourage new 
innovation).  
160 Id. 
161 The Economic Recovery Tax Act, P.L. 9734, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). See Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, H.R. 4242, Pub. L. 97-34, 97th Cong. 119 (1981) (reporting civilian research to GNP ratio 
is 1.5 percent, compared with 1.9 percent for Japan and 2.3 percent for West Germany).  
162 See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Unintended Legislative Inertia, 55 GA L. REV. _ (2020) (describing the history of the research credit that 
was created as part of a cluster of temporary provisions to allow flexible legislation).  
163 The R&D credit been extended 17 times, of which 7 times retroactively. In 2015, President Obama signed into law the Protecting 
Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, Pub. L. No. 114113 (2015) that made the credit permanent and, for the first time, 
permitted small businesses to use the credit to offset both their regular, Alternative Minimum Tax, and payroll tax liabilities. For a 
detailed legislative history of the acts extending the R&D credit see Eyal-Cohen, Unintended Legislative Inertia, Appendix (2021).  
164 Out of 6,241 manufacturing firms that claimed the research credit in tax year 2013, about 812 firms were in the chemical 
manufacturing field (13%). Statistics of Income, Corporation Research Credit, Table 2. Corporations Claiming a Credit for 
Increasing Research Activities on Form 6765 [1][2]: Selected Items, by Manufacturing Subsectors, Tax Year 2013, 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-corporation-research-credit. 
165 26 USC § 41(b). Contract research expenses are limited to 65 percent of any amount paid to any person (other than an employee 
of the taxpayer) for qualified research. 26 USC § 41(b)(3)(A). 
166 In calculating the credit, the firms base period research was not permitted to be less than 50% of the current year's research 
spending. The credits statutory rate was initially set at 25 percent and applied only to increases in a firms research spending over 
its average spending in a base period consisting of the previous three years. Id.
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or improved business component of the taxpayer as part of a process of experimentation.167
Moreover, the purpose of the research has to relate to obtaining knowledge about a new or 
improved function, performance, or reliability or quality, but not style, taste, cosmetic, or seasonal 
design factors.168 Regardless of whether they meet these prerequisites, expenses are ineligible if 
they are incurred after the beginning of commercial production; if they are related to the adaptation 
or duplication of existing business components; or if they involve market research, routine data 
collection, routine testing or inspection, quality-control testing, social science research, grant-
funded research, or research conducted outside the United States.169
The credit amount is calculated by multiplying the companys fixed-base ratio by their 
average annual gross receipts for the preceding four taxable years.170 The fixed-base ratio is a 
historical percentage denoting the companys total qualified research expenditures over total 
gross receipts.171 For start-up companies with fewer than three years of gross receipts, the 
calculation is multifaceted, starting from a fixed-base percentage of 3 percent and thereafter 
gradually transitioning to a fixed-base ratio based on actual R&D.  
Much of the R&D credits ineffectiveness derives from its complexity and several 
arrangements added to refrain from punishing firms that maintain a solid R&D record,172 to avoid 
benefiting companies that increase their R&D spending immediately after the base period,173 and 
to permit companies to elect a simpler way to calculate the credit.174 Alas, these noteworthy goals 
add many additional components to the R&D credit and much intricacy. In addition, in order to 
narrow misuse, gaming, or overclaiming, the R&D credit contains several anti-abuse rules. For 
example, the credit is not available for government-funded research or via private grant.175
Companies claiming the credit cannot double dip, thus, they must reduce immediate expensing 
for the amount of the credit.176 The R&D credit can be combined with the Orphan Drug Credit for 
the clinical stage but not for the same expenses. Moreover, many states offer R&D tax credits to 
encourage in-state innovation that can be combined with the R&D tax credit at the federal level.177
The R&D tax credit also comes with a high price tag. The Joint Committee on Taxation 
estimates that in 2020, the federal government will lose $12.6 billion due to the R&D credit.178
Yet, due to the difficulty in evaluating innovation output and tracing it to R&D spending, little is 
167 26 U.S.C. § 41(d)(1).  
168 26 U.S.C. § 41(d)(3).  
169 26 U.S.C. § 41(d)(4)(B)-(H). 
170 26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1).  
171 26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(3). 
172 26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(3)(C) (In no event shall the fixed-base percentage exceed 16 percent.). 
173 26 U.S.C. § 41(c) (providing that at a minimum, the base amount is no less than 50 percent of the qualified research expenses 
for that year.).  
174 Firms can elect to use an alternative simplified manner to calculate the R&D credit as 14 percent of qualified research expenses 
for the taxable year as exceeds 50 percent of the average qualified research expenses for the 3 preceding taxable years. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 41(c)(4)(A). If the taxpayer has no qualified research expenses in any of 3 preceding taxable years the alternative simplified credit 
rate is 6 percent of qualified research expenses. 26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(4)(B). 
175 26 U.S.C. § 41(d)(4)(H). 
176 26 U.S.C. § 280C(c)(1). 
177 Catherine Fazio, Jorge Guzman, Scott Stern, The Impact of State-Level R&D Tax Credits on the Quantity and Quality of 
Entrepreneurship, NBER Working Paper No. 26099, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26099 (casting doubt as to the efficacy of 
state-level R&D tax credits and observing a decline in the rate of formation of growth-oriented startups over time).   
178 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 114th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2019-2023, at 
tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2019).  
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known about the effects of tax incentives in spurring innovation. During congressional debates on 
whether to extend the R&D credit, the National Science Foundation supported the renewal of the 
credit for its contribution to a positive research growth trend.179 Over the years, studies on the 
correlation between the R&D tax credit and R&D spending have been mixed.180 Some noted that 
a dollar of R&D credit is associated with a dollar of investment in R&D, while others claimed a 
different ratio.181 Regardless, what these studies do not tell us is whether such R&D spending 
would not have happened independent of the R&D credit and as a normal part of the companys 
innovation efforts and attempts to procure supra competitive profits.   
Lastly, it is worth noting that when Congress enacted the R&D credit, it also created the 
Basic Research Credit.182 The basic research credit offers corporations a credit for expenditures 
made to qualified nonprofit organizations for collaborative primary research. The definition of 
basic research entails domestic original examination for the development of scientific knowledge 
not having an explicit commercial objective.  Basic research payments are cash amounts paid by 
a corporation to a qualified educational or tax-exempt organization for basic research pursuant to 
a written agreement between the parties.183 The basic credit calculation is not similar to the general 
R&D credit, which adds yet more complexity to an already intricate incentive system and increases 
hurdles of new and smaller firms trying to secure tax benefits.184 By enacting the basic research 
tax credit the government sought to encourage taxpayers to engage, and reward them for their 
investments, in primary research that has no specific commercial objective in hope that later on 
firms and investors will continue to develop that knowledge. 
C. Orphan Drug Tax Credit (Orphan Drug Credit) 
Aside from the R&D tax credit and immediate R&D expensing that apply to all types of 
investments in innovation, the Tax Code provides an apparatus designed specifically to encourage 
pharmaceutical research. In 1983, the Orphan Drug Act created a new temporary tax credit for 
expenditures related to human clinical testing for rare diseases in the FDA approval process.185
This credit focused on rare disorders and uncommon ailments that lack commercial pharmaceutical 
sponsorship (i.e., orphaned) due to their limited potential of financial profits resulting from a 
179 See National Science Foundation, National Patterns of R&D Resources, 1994, tables B6, B9, B12.  
180 See, e.g., John Van Reenen, Kieu-Trang Nguyen, Ralf Martin, Elias Einiö, & Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Do Tax Incentives for 
Rsearch Increase Firm Innovation? An RD Design for R&D, NBER Working Paper 22405 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22405 (finding evidence of a causal impact of research and development (R&D) tax incentives on 
innovation.); WesleyYin, Market Incentives and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 1060, 1061 (2008) 
(demonstrating Tax credits can stimulate R&D); Frischmann, supra note 21, at 382 (finding tax incentives counterbalance 
innovative process market failures). But see, Robert Eisner, Steven H. Albert & Martin A. Sullivan, The New Incremental Tax 
Credit for R&D: Incentive or Disincentive?, 37 NATL TAX J. 171, 181 (1984) (reporting no positive impact between the research 
credit to R&D expenditures).    
181 See Robert D. Atkinson, Expanding the R&E Tax Credit To Drive Innovation, Competitiveness and Prosperity, 32 J. TECH.
TRANSFER 617, 619 (2007) (arguing all studies found investment of $1 of research credit produces more than $1 in R&D 
expenditures).   
182 26 U.S.C. §41(e).  
183 26 U.S.C. § 41(e)(6). 
184 It is calculated as the taxpayers basic research payments over its qualified organization base period amount. The portion of the 
basic research payments which does not exceed the taxpayers qualified organization base period amount is treated as contract 
expenses for purposes of the R&D tax credit, which can be claimed concurrent with the basic research credit. QOBPA is the sum 
of the taxpayers minimum basic research amount and maintenance-of-effort amount. 26 U.S.C. § 41(e)(4) and (5). The base period 
is the three-year period ending with the tax year immediately preceding the taxpayers first tax year.  
185 Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 45C).  The cost of the basic credit was estimated 
to be around $6.0 billion a year in 2010. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND 
MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 89 (Dec. 2010).   
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smaller scope of patients and future clients.186 Due to the limited size of the patient market for 
orphan drugs, the government provides, in addition to patents, special orphan-designated grants, 
expedited approval and waivers procedures, a 7-year marketing exclusivity protection from 
generics,187 and additional tax benefits to assure pharmaceutical companies can recover their 
investments.188
Previously scheduled to expire after 1987, Congress repeatedly extended the orphan drug 
tax credit and eventually made it permanent in 1997.189 Following the U.S., other key markets also 
adopted similar orphan drug acts, most notably Japan in 1993 and the European Union in 2000. 
The Orphan Drug Act provided a tax credit for (then) 50 percent of domestic qualified clinical 
testing expenses incurred in the process of developing orphan drugs, as well as amended the FDA 
Act to include an exclusive period of promotion and marketing rights for such designated drugs.190
It also allowed unused credit to be carried back three years and carried forward up to fifteen years 
following the year in which the credit was earned.191
The tax credit is available for human clinical testing to the extent the research is related to 
the use of a drug designated under the FDA to treat a rare disease or condition that influences a 
smaller portion of the general population.192 A rare disease or condition includes those affecting 
fewer than 200,000 people in the U.S., or affecting more than 200,000 in the U.S. but without 
reasonable prospects that such medication will be profitable, that is, its cost of development will 
be recovered from its sales in the U.S.193
Scholars and professionals have noted that the Orphan Drug Act has been successful in 
achieving its goals by providing opportunities, incentivizing corporate investments, doubling the 
drugs available for rare diseases, and endorsing hundreds of new orphan drugs for clinical trials.194
The Act spurred the development of lifesaving therapies for many rare disorders, such as cystic 
fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, and various pediatric cancers.195 Moreover, strong patient advocacy, 
venture capital investments, industry cooperation, clinical advancements, and administrative 
186 For example, muscular dystrophy, Tourette's Syndrome, and Lou Gehrig's Disease. The use of the term Orphan refers to drugs 
for rare diseases and conditions that entail limited opportunities for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to undertake their 
development and production. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, section 1(b), 96 Stat. 2049, 2049 (1983) (providing an 
overview on the environment of research in the area of rare conditions and diseases). 
187 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a). 
188 Rachel E. Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1992, 2008 (2018). 
189 Rachel Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement (2018) (describing policymakers clearly understand the potential benefits of 
implementing innovation-related policies through the FDA approval process.) 
190 26 U.S.C. § 45C; Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. section 360cc).  
191 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, § 604, 111 Stat. 788, 863 (1997). Any amount claimed under the orphan tax credit 
increases the base period for research expenses under the R&D tax credit and reduces the deduction otherwise available under 
immediate R&D expensing). 26 U.S.C. § 280C.  
192 21 U.S.C § 45(c). 
193 21 U.S.C § 360bb.  
194 Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal To Promote Pharmacologic Research, To Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug 
Innovation and Improvement, and To Reduce Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1074 (1994) (reviewing 
the success, limitation, and criticism on the Orphan Drug Act);  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Developing Orphan Produces: FDA & 
Rare Disease Day 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm107301.pdf  
(reporting an increase of 300 treatments for orphan diseases receiving FDA approval in the 25 years following the enactment of 
the Orphan Drug Act enactment).  
195 Wesley Yin, Market Incentives and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 1060, 1061 (2008) (demonstrating that the 
Orphan Drug Act increased production of drugs for rare diseases); Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., https://perma.cc/E3E7-X6V6 (The program has successfully enabled the development and marketing of over 600 
drugs and biologic products for rare diseases since 1983. In contrast, fewer than 10 such products supported by industry came to 
market between 1973 and 1983.).  
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motivating forces have been considerably changing the scene of orphan drug research in the last 
few years. For instance, the Office of Orphan Products Development (OOPD) approved 89 new 
orphan designations in 2018 and 81 in 2019, the highest numbers annually since the passage of the 
Orphan Drug Act.196 Every February, organizations mark the annual Rare Disease Day to raise 
awareness about the effects of such ailments on peoples lives.197 Scientific advances in rare 
diseases along with accelerated FDA review highlight policymakers growing commitment to 
propel orphan drug development. Recent empirical studies demonstrated that receiving an orphan-
drug designation provides, in and of itself, is a strong positive signal for potential investors.198
Accordingly, the last few years also saw vast investment opportunities for pharmaceutical firms 
associated with orphan drugs in partnerships and corporate mergers and acquisitions.199 Orphan 
drug credit claims increased from $290 million in 2010200 to $1.8 billion in 2020, with a projection 
of over $4 billion in 2024.201
Other academics, policymakers, and journalists have criticized the orphan drug laws for 
their effects on the price of drugs.202 They have claimed that the orphan designation is 
overinclusive and harms pharmaceutical competition. Many drugs for rare diseases that have 
entered the market over the past few decades have become exceedingly profitable. Pharmaceutical 
firms were accused of reaping government financial and procedural benefits for orphan drug 
development while charging excessive prices for these medications.203 For example, AIDS 
medications, originally thought to be unprofitable, later turned out to be highly profitable due to 
their cost and marketing outside of the U.S.204 In 2015, several researchers from Johns Hopkins 
196 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Total Number of Orphan Drug Approvals in the Month Requiring Exclusivity 
Determinations Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fdatrack/view/track.cfm?program=osmp&status=public&id=OSMP-OOPD-Number-
orphan-drug-approvals-in-the-month&fy=2019. 
197 See, e.g., FDA, Rare Disease Day 2020, https://www.fda.gov/industry/orphan-products-development-events/rare-disease-day-
2020#:~:text=%22Rare%20is%20many.&text=On%20February%2029%2C%202020%2C%20FDA,of%20which%20have%20n
o%20treatment. 
198 Kathleen L. Miller, Do Investors Value the FDA Orphan Drug Designation?, 12 ORPHANET J. OF RARE DISEASES 114, 115 
(2017) (demonstrating stock prices increasing by 3.36% after the announcement of the orphan drug designation).  
Philippe Gorry & Diego Useche, Orphan Drug Designations as Valuable Intangible Assets for IPO Investors in Pharma-Biotech 
Companies, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24021, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24021. See also 
Dayton Misfeldt & James C. Robinson, Orphan Diseases or Population Health? Policy Choices Drive Venture Capital Investments,
Health Aff.: Blog (July 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZE4N-B6RH (demonstrating venture capital companies growing interest in 
orphan disease treatments and connecting it to policy choices).  
199 David H. Crean, Why Invest in Rare Diseases & Orphan Drugs?, (2.19.2019) 
https://pharmaboardroom.com/articles/investments-and-deal-activity-in-orphan-drug-products. 
200 U.S. Dept of Treasury, Tax Expenditures, Table 191: Estimates of Total Income Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2008-
2014, available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/tax-policy/tax-expenditures, at 301.  
201 U.S. Dept of Treasury, Tax Expenditures, Table 1: Estimates of Total Income Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years S 2018-2028, 
available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/tax-policy/tax-expenditures, at 25.  
202 See, e.g., Sarah Jane Tribble, Senator Grassley Launches Inquiry Into Orphan Drug Law's Effect on Prices, NPR (Feb. 10, 
2017), https://www .npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/02/10/514373480/sen-grassley-launches -inquiry-into-orphan-drug-laws-
effect-on-prices (stating that officials have become interested in revisiting Orphan Drug legislation); Nicholas Bagley, Incidental 
Economist, The Benefits and Costs of Promoting the Development of New Orphan Drugs, pt. 3 (2017), 
https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2.12-orphan-drug.pdf (outlining the costs and 
problems surrounding Orphan Drug legislation).  
203 Carolyn Y. Johnson, High Prices Make Once-Neglected "Orphan' Drugs a Booming Business, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/high-prices-make-once-neglected-orphan-drugs-a-booming-
business/2016/08/04/539d0968-1e10-11e6-9c81-4be1c14fb8c8_story.html. 
204 See LiHsien Rin-Laures & Diane Janofsky, Recent Developments Concerning the Orphan Drug Act, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 269, 
282-87 (1991). See also Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/ucm2005525.htm (outlining the success of the 
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University urged the government to close orphan drug loopholes and prevent pharmaceutical 
companies from gaming the system.205 They claimed the majority of the best-selling drugs had 
enjoyed orphan designation in their nascent stages by initially listing only a single indication for 
the drugs use, but past FDA approval ended up being marketed off-label for much more common 
conditions while inflating drug prices and hiking insurance premiums.206 Moreover, a recent study 
even demonstrated that, on the whole, certain rare diseases are not so uncommon and influence 
25 to 30 million people in the U.S.207As such, and with the combination of government fiscal and 
administrative benefits, they can become lucrative investments.208
On the other hand, tax practitioners criticized that the scope of the credit was very limited, 
as it only covered costs connected with human clinical testing rather than pre-clinical animal 
testing or research for the development of therapeutic compounds.209 The credit is restricted and 
does not cover basic research into the sources and causes of rare illnesses, such as preventative or 
genetic factors research. During the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017, policymakers 
estimated that the orphan tax credit, at its current rate, would cost the government more than $47 
billion over the next decade.210 Accordingly, the credit rate for the orphan drug credit was reduced 
to 25% for tax years beginning in 2018.211 With the reduction in the credit rate, the estimated 
revenue loss due to the orphan drug credit is projected to be around $1.8 billion a year.212
D. The Late Qualifying Therapeutic Discovery Project Credit (QTDP credit) 
Enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010,213 the QTDP 
credit provided companies with 250 or fewer employees a 50 percent nonrefundable investment 
tax credit (up to a maximum credit of $5 million per firm) for costs paid or incurred in qualifying 
therapeutic discovery projects.214 The government allocated $ 1 billion under the QTDP credit for 
Orphan Drug Act). But see Johanne Bissonette, Close-up on Rare Diseases and Orphan Drugs, UNIVALOR, 
http://www.univalor.ca/en/media/article/close-rare-diseases-and-orphan-drugs, (mptomh that only 400 rare diseases out of the 
7000-8000 rare diseases have an FDA approved treatment).
205 Martin Makary, Orphan Drug Loophole Needs Closing, Johns Hopkins Researchers Say, JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE, Nov. 
19, 2015, 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/orphan_drug_loophole_needs_closing_johns_hopkins_researchers_say#:
~:text=Health%20experts%20at%20Johns%20Hopkins,In%20a%20commentary%20published%20Nov (citing commentary 
published at the American Journal of Clinical Oncology).  
206 Id. (providing the example of the drug rituximab, originally approved to treat follicular B-cell non-Hodgkins lymphoma that  
affects 14,000 patients a year but later used for other types of cancer and organ rejection, and rheumatoid arthritis that affects 1.3 
million Americans and becoming the 12th best seller drug in the U.S..).  
207 David E.Fagnan, Austin A.Gromatzky, Roger M.Stein, Jose-MariaFernandez, and Andrew W. Lo,  Financing Drug Discovery 
for Orphan Diseases,  19 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 533, 537 (2014).  
208 Id. (The study utilized information from 28 nonclinical vagrant medication ventures at the National Institute of Health's National 
Center for Advanced Translational Sciences (NCATS) to survey the advantages related with financing orphan drug claiming proper 
diversification may lead to 25% rates of return.).  
209 See David M. Richardson, The Orphan Drug Tax Credit: An Inadequate Response to an Ill-Defined Problem, 6 AM. J. TAX 
POLY 135, 173-80 (1987) (discussing the disadvantages of the new credit limitation on the type of clinical testing). 
210 U.S. Dept of Treasury, Tax Expenditures FY2017, Table 2a. Estimates of Total Income Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 
2016-2026, available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/tax-policy/tax-expenditures, at 27. 
211 P.L. No. 115-97, 115th Cong., § 13401(a) (Modification of Orphan Drug Credit).  
Zachary Brennan, Senate, House Agree to Cut Orphan Drug Research Credit in Half in Tax Bill, Reg. Aff. Professionals Soc'y: 
Reg. Focus (Dec. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/9UHZ-8VT8; Katie Thomas & Sheila Kaplan, Congress Weighs Repeal of Tax Credit 
for Rare Disease Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/ARC9-96RD.  
212 U.S. Dept of Treasury, Tax Expenditures FY2021, Table 2a. Estimates of Total Income Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 
2020-2029, available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/tax-policy/tax-expenditures, at 25.  
213 Section 9023, Qualifying Therapeutic Discovery Project, of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148, added 
new section 48D to the Internal Revenue Code.   
214 Qualifying therapeutic discovery project expenses did not include any cost for remuneration for employees, interest expense, 
facility maintenance expenses, service cost. 26 U.S.C. § 48D (repeated 2018). 
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taxable years 2009 and 2010. The Secretary of Treasury acted in consultation with the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services to award certifications for qualified investments.215 A 
qualifying therapeutic discovery project was defined as a research endeavor designed to develop 
a product, process, or therapy to diagnose, treat, or prevent diseases through pre-clinical activities, 
clinical trials, clinical studies, and research protocols, or by developing technology or products 
designed to diagnose diseases and conditions, including molecular and companion drugs and 
diagnostics, or to further the delivery or administration of therapeutics.216
In order to claim the QTDP credit, companies had to go through a grant-like process. Firm 
had to apply to attain certification for qualifying investments and demonstrate that their project 
has reasonable potential to result in new therapies to treat areas of unmet medical need. That need 
could be to prevent, detect, or treat chronic or acute disease and conditions, to reduce long-term 
health care costs in the United States, or to significantly advance the goal of curing cancer within 
a 30-year period. Other factors that could help grant applicants were the potential to create and 
sustain high quality, high paying jobs in the U.S. and advance its competitiveness in the fields of 
life, biological, and medical sciences. Once granted, firms were able to elect to receive approved 
QTDP credit in the form of Treasury grants of 50 percent of the qualifying investment (not 
includible in gross income).217
According to the IRS, the QTDP program awarded total grants of $970 million and $17 
million in total tax credits.218 The media reported that over 5,600 applications were filed ultimately 
awarding 4,606 projects from 2,923 companies deemed eligible. As a result, the most a company 
could receive for any one project was about $244 thousands leaving firms disappointed for getting 
much smaller allotments than requested.219 While vaccines research could have qualified under the 
QTDP credit, the absolute majority of companies receiving grants operated in the field of cancer, 
chronic diseases, and therapies to repair tissue and organ damage.220 Finally, the program 
concluded in December 31, 2013 and was formally repealed in the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2018.221
E. Patent Donations 
Another form of R&D incentive somewhat grounded as a tax apparatus is deductible 
charitable contributions of intellectual property from for-profit firms to nonprofit organizations 
such as research institutions and universities. In addition to pursuing altruistic, reputational or other 
strategic goals, for-profit firms can support a non-profitable organization by transferring unused 
IP with a potential for stream of income in the future. Through patent donations, firms transfer 
215 Joint Committee Technical Explanation, JCX-18-10 (2018).  
216 Id.
217 IRS Notice 2010-45 (describing the process by which taxpayers can apply to have a therapeutic discovery project certified as 
eligible for a credit or grant). 
218 Internal Revenue Service, Businesses, Small Business and Self-Employed, Qualifying Therapeutic Discovery Project Credits 
and Grants, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Qualifying-Therapeutic-Discovery-Project-
Credits-and-Grants. 
219 Steven Overly, Biotech Grants Stretched Thin, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2010), at A10, (quoting NIH Director Francis S. Collins 
saying It was an indication of the great opportunity and interest that there were so many applications received Of course, with 
a $1 billion total amount of money available and with so many of the applicants being judged as entirely appropriate for this 
program, it was not possible to make awards as large as $5 million.).  
220 Id.
221 The Qualifying Therapeutic Discovery Project credit was repealed H.R. 1625 the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, 
P.L. 115-141 (2018).   
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indolent but conceivably valuable IP to universities and non-profit organizations capable of, or 
motivated to, develop it.  
Large companies like Boeing have made patent donations on multiple occasions. In 2001, 
Boeing donated to the University of Pennsylvania IP related to a thermoplastic syntactic foam, a 
type of material Boeing initially developed to eliminate electromagnetic interference in antenna 
units mounted in aircraft wings. Research performed by University of Pennsylvania scientists on 
the heels of this patent donation subsequently led to the discovery that this material is bio-
compatible and has structural properties similar to those of natural bone, which may render it useful 
for bone augmentation procedures.222 The following year, Boeing donated a patent to Vanderbilt 
University covering particle-separation technology, originally designed for use in outer space and 
later utilized by Vanderbilt researchers for pharmaceutical nanotechnology.223 Subsequently, in 
2003, Boeing donated microwave dehydration technology to Washington State University.224 The 
technology was originally developed to dry spacecrafts upon ocean landing, but Washington State 
University researchers were able to use it in R&D on additive-free food products.225 These are 
clear illustrations of innovation cycle progression by which a firm unable or uninterested in further 
developing its technology for additional downstream applications donates it forward to researchers 
that could successfully advance knowledge and technology diffusion in the pharmaceutical and 
related areas. 
Procter & Gamble is another example of a conglomerate with established track record of 
donating its IP. In 2000, the firm donated 196 patents covering its COX-2 inhibitor technology
commonly known as super aspirinto Vanderbilt University while providing additional funds 
for R&D and to cover expenses associated with patent maintenance for a period of three years. 226
At the time, Procter & Gambles director of pharmaceuticals noted that the firm was creating more 
technology than it can possibly develop solely in-house.227  In 2003, Procter & Gamble donated 
patents covering a form of nanotechnology known as Cubosome to the Cincinnati Childrens 
Hospital, who subsequently used it in R&D on a synthetic vernix for coating premature infants.228
Since 1958, the Tax Code has allowed deductibility of intellectual property contributions 
in the like of those mentioned above, viewing intellectual property as merely a subcategory of 
intangible property.229 Yet, it was not until the late 1990s that firms began to widely utilize this 
tax benefit realizing they could save millions in tax liability by donating IP to non-profit 
organizations. Due to the ever-changing nature of intellectual property, there has not been an all-
222 Boing Mediaroom, Boeing Patent Donation to the University of Pennsylvania Could Help Treat Bone Disease and Injuries, 
Oct. 15, 2001, https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2001-10-15-Boeing-Patent-Donation-to-the-University-of-Pennsylvania-Could-
Help-Treat-Bone-Disease-and-Injuries. 
223 Boeing Donates Electrophoresis Patent to Vanderbilt, VAND. NEWS (Feb. 3, 2002), 
https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2003/02/03/boeing-donates-electrophoresis-patent-to-vanderbilt-60112/.  
224 Boeing donates patents; food processing could change, WASH. ST. U. INSIDER (May 9, 2003), 
https://news.wsu.edu/2003/05/09/boeing-donates-patents-food-processing-could-change/. 
225 Id., ib.
226 Leigh Macmillan, Procter & Gamble Patents to Spark New Drug Discovery, REPORTER (Nov. 10, 2000), 
https://reporter.newsarchive.vumc.org/index.html?ID=1269.   
227 Id. ib.
228 Cincinnati Children's Hospital Receives Cubosome Patent Donation from Procter & Gamble, BIOTECH. PATENT NEWS (Sep. 
2003), http://bi.gale.com.ezp.slu.edu/global/article/GALE|A110537606/894ee9293cf403ed7bf117f87bbd1de6?u=sain44199.  
229 It includes, but is not limited to computer software, Patents, inventions, formulae, processes, designs, patterns, trade secrets, or 
know-how, Copyrights and literary, musical, or artistic compositions, Trademarks, trade names, or brand names, Franchises, 
licenses, or contracts, Methods, programs, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys, studies, forecasts, estimates, customer lists, 
or technical data, etc. See Internal Revenue Manual 4.48.5.1 (2020).  
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inclusive definition of such assets, but a guiding list of their common forms. Charitable 
contributions of qualified intellectual property can include patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade 
names, trade secrets, know-how, software, and other similar property.230 To be able to deduct the 
charitable intellectual property transfer, there needs to be a transfer of the taxpayers entire interest 
in the intellectual property to the charity under written agreement that retain the donors right to 
manufacture or use the product covered by the patent.231 The transfer agreement has to identify the 
details of the transfer and acknowledge that the donor has not obtained any economic benefit.  
Alas, there are complex issues related to assessing the value of innovation covered under 
intellectual property donations that harm their effectiveness. It remains a difficult task to transform 
speculative profits that depend on different future occasions into real present value. Thus, there is 
much potential for tax planning and abuse.232 The higher the value claimed for the contributed 
intellectual property, the greater the tax benefit to the donor. At the same time, there might be little 
or no benefit to the charities, as many gifts of patents, copyrights, and trademarks turn out to be 
useless or create far less income than anticipated. Certain firms aggressively used this tactic by 
donating valueless patents using overinflated valuations to benefit from the charitable deduction. 
For example, in 1996 Dow Chemical donated to Case Western Reserve University over 10,000 
patents and saved over $40 million in maintenance fees and tax credits.233
After widespread abuse of inflating values of IP contributions, in 2004, Congress felt that 
assessing the actual revenue generated from such propertyrather than the expected stream of 
incomewould give a more precise estimate of what the charitable deduction is worth. It passed 
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 that added a rule that the deductible amount of the 
charitable contribution must be reduced by any long-term capital gain that would be realized if the 
property were sold at its fair market value at the time of the contribution. De facto, this change 
limits the charitable deduction for contribution of intellectual property to the donors adjusted 
basis. Due to the fact that most intellectual property owners deduct developmental costs, research 
and experimental costs, or amortize their cost basis over the years, their adjusted basis most likely 
will be minimal if any; thus, they will not be eligible for significant (or any) deduction for their 
contribution of intellectual property. Accordingly, Congress followed with a rule allowing a 
contributors of intellectual property to charity to deduct a certain ratio of projected yearly income 
produced by such asset for up to 10 years on a sliding rate scale.234 This change was not significant 
but added more complexity, uncertainty, and tax controversy.   
Today, there are still many complications related to the valuation of innovation rights, 
projection of income, and other beneficent and domain arrangement, which makes this tax 
incentive inefficient and costly. The post-2004 cost-basis limitation disincentivized and almost 
230 26 U.S.C. §170(e)(1)(B)(iii).  
231 26 U.S.C. §170(f)(3); IRS Notice 2004-7.  
232 Teresa Riordan, Patents; Some Corporations Take Generous Tax Write-Offs for Donated Patents, An Industry Gadfly Says, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 17, 2003) (quoting concerns raised over many patent donations being worthless with overinflated 
appraisals for tax purposes);  Cassell Bryan-Low, Deductions for Patent Donations Draw Deeper Scrutiny from IRS, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 7, 2003) (describing IRS agents questioning the legitimacy of the patent valuations). 
233 Ron Layton & Peter Bloch, Please Donate Patents on the Shelf; Tax benefits can be Focused for Greater Good, Legal Times 
Magazine (Mar. 2004) https://iipi.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/IP_Donations.pdf (citing Rick Gross from Dow Industries 
describing this contribution 25 percent of our patents had no business value. We downsized the portfolio by over 10,000 patents 
and saved over $40 million in five years. Additionally, the donation of unused intellectual property has resulted in millions of 
dollars of tax credits over the past six years.).  
234 26 U.S.C. §170(m). Tax years 1 and 2- deductible percentage of 100%, tax year 3- 90%,  tax year 4-80%, tax year 5-70%, tax 
year 6- 60%, tax year 7- 50%, tax year 8- 40%, tax year 9- 30%, tax year 10- 20%, tax years 11 and 12- 10%. Id. In order to be 
eligible for such future charitable deduction the donor must provide a written notice to the charitable organization. §170(m)(8)(B).  
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diminished the volume of charitable gifts of intellectual property. Many scholars opined that the 
2004 change took away entirely economic incentives for patent donations and left non-profit 
organizations to rely strictly on philanthropy and detached generosity of managers of for-profit 
organizations.235 This also likely hindered collaborative efforts between the private and public 
sector in developing innovations.236
To summarize this Part, current innovation tax incentives are complex, highly prone to abuse, 
and apply equally to innovation research done in all types of organizations. Even tax incentives 
specifically designed for pharmaceutical R&D such as Orphan Drug Credit the late QTDP have 
applied (and misused) to advance chronic diseases, thus prioritized the latter over vaccine 
development. Moreover, as will be further demonstrate next, these tax incentives were utilized and 
benefited mainly established firms with positive income. Small and start-up pharmaceutical 
companies with little or no positive income that sought to take advantage of the immediate 
deduction or the R&D and Orphan Drug tax credits had to carry forward these tax benefits to an 
indefinite point in time when they become profitable, if any. While there is no single best strategy 
to encourage scientific research for developing new vaccines, the next Part will propose a new 
framework and a fresh approach to channel funds into advancing human immunology and vaccine 
discovery in a more effective manner.  
V. REDESIGNING TAX POLICY FOR VACCINE DEVELOPMENT
The fair answer is: Does it have an impact? Yes. Is it the be-all, end-all? No. 
J.J. Finkelstein237
It is worthwhile at this point to recap the inefficiencies of developing pharmaceutical 
technologies for human immunotherapy prior to prescribing a proposal to tackle them. In our 
current day and age, there are numerous pathogens causing diseases for which there are no 
approved vaccines or therapies.238 Alas, vaccine development encompasses extreme uncertain 
conditions and unknowns about market effects, legal implications, competitive conditions, product 
pricing, and delayed commercialization. Recent anti-vaccination movements prefer relying on risk 
of infection or herd-immunization than paying for the price of the vaccine. Accordingly, vaccine 
development suffers from severe underinvestment. Pharmaceutical firms face long lags in 
harvesting returns on their vaccine research investments compared to ordinary investments in 
common drugs. Even the few firms that do pursue vaccine development face low return on 
investment because vaccines are typically a one-time-use product with low rate of repeat users. 
Specifically, the clinical trial, traditionally conducted in three phases of increasing size, are the 
235 Bo Carlsson, Jeffrey Glass, Craig Nard & Richard Barrett, Intellectual Property (IP) Management: Organizational Processes 
and Structures, and The Role of IP Donations, 33 J. TECH. TRANSFER 549 (2008) (generating good will, profiting from tax 
deductions and other financial benefits, and philanthropy were motives of the firms to donate their patents.). But see Tax Treatment 
of Patent Donations in a Post-Jobs Act World, 18 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 295 (2004) (By reducing the deduction granted from fair 
market value to a percentage of the donees income, the American Jobs Creation Act begins the realignment of the practice of 
patent donation with the public interest.).  
236 Nicole Ziegler et al., Why Do Firms Give Away Their Patents for Free?, WORLD PATENT INFORMATION xxx (2013) 17, 
https://www.hiig.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/1-s2.0-S0172219013001592-main.pdf (Since a change of law regarding tax 
benefits through patent donations in 2004, the incentives for firms to donate moved away from mainly being financial-drive towards 
a combination of financial benefits and fostering innovation).  
237 J.J. Finkelstein, President and chief executive of RegeneRx remarking on his companys experience with the QTDP credit in 
Overly, supra note 219. 
238 See e.g. Stanley A. Plotkin et al., Establishing a Global Vaccine-Development Fund, 373 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 297, 298 (2015) 
(listing vaccine-preventable diseases for which there is no commercially available vaccine).  
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most cost-intensive than any other drug development process.239 In order to maintain protection of 
human subjects in research the FDA requires compliance, knowledge, and heavy investment in 
human capital with expertise in clinical administration, medical recruitment, HIPAA procedures 
and confidentiality, and scientific control processes that the public sector cannot provide on its 
own.240
For those reasons, the level of private spending on vaccine discovery falls short of the 
amount that is warranted by the social benefits of advancing human immunology. The total return 
to society from vaccine development and prevention of a widespread outbreak is much greater 
than the return on investment for the few pharmaceutical firms that do engage in such research.241
As noted above, an outbreak may temporarily reduce or suspend some of these market 
inefficiencies, but we should be careful not to assume it solves them. If anything, the recent Covid-
19 pandemic provided an extreme illustration of the importance of preparedness and prevention to 
the well-being of society and the economy.  
Hence, government intervention is essential to drive the demand for scientific innovation 
in the immunology field. Public health imperatives prescribe robust vaccine development as the 
most cost-effective tool to prevent wide-spread and increased health costs. Society already spends 
abundant resources on R&D acknowledging its importance to spurring innovation. Alas, at present, 
current tax incentives used to spur R&D generally, and in the pharmaceutical context, fail to accord 
to differences between mainstream drugs and vaccines, or allocate efficiently resources for vaccine 
research. There exists, today more than ever, a stark justification to reassess and redirect such 
government intervention in more efficient ways by better targeting incentives for vaccine research 
and development.
In this Part we propose ways by which the tax system can be more redesigned more 
effectively in the vaccine context than direct subsidies. The tax system puts the choice of projects 
and progression into private hands with better knowledge and expertise to make such decisions 
than public health agencies. Next, we introduce specific ways by which policymakers can better 
employ the tax system via existing tax measures to increase preparedness and reverse insufficient 
levels of pre-outbreak vaccine research and development. 
A. Prioritizing Underfunded Qualified Vaccine Discovery Projects  
Today, even as epidemics and pandemic are projected to occur with increased frequency,242
tax incentives for vaccine development are still perceived by most players in the pharmaceutical 
research arena as anecdotal and trivial.243 Taxation does not provide strong enough mechanisms 
to nudge companies towards making huge investment in time and money in therapeutic 
discoveries. Tax benefits provide good fortune the accounting firm may come upon at the end of 
the year, but it is far from affecting, or being factored as a meaningful part of, the decision to 
239 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.   
240 See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do In Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C.
L. REV. 491, 510-511 (2014) (describing the stages of undertaking new drug through three phases of expensive clinical trials); 
Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancers IP , 96 N.C.L. REV. 297, 333 (2018) (noting clinical trials are expensive, arduous, multiyear affairs).  
241 On the uncertainty that is involved in developing innovation see generally, Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens of Innovation, 43 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 978 (2016).  
242 See e.g. GAVI, 5 REASONS WHY PANDEMICS LIKE COVID-19 ARE BECOMING MORE LIKELY (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/5-reasons-why-pandemics-like-covid-19-are-becoming-more-likely 
243 See infra note 237 and accompanying text.  
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engage in vaccine research efforts. However, it is possible, that if structured appropriately, the tax 
system may offer purposeful ex ante subsidies for vaccine research that can complement other ex 
post IP and non-IP incentives for vaccine innovation.   
We begin with a general observation that we need to change the fact that the current tax 
system values investment in drugs that target common or chronic ailments over vaccine 
research.244 Drug development generally, and vaccines research specifically, are extremely costly 
activities. Yet, vaccine research endeavors yield limited profits compared to ordinary drugs thus 
suffer from severe underinvestment and amplified market uncertainty. We emphasize that by 
applying the same level of tax incentives to both traditional, technological, and pharmaceutical 
innovations to vaccine research is flawed. Treating all types of pharmaceutical research efforts the 
same under our tax system, fails to recognize the opposite effect occurs. Such equal treatment of 
investments with unequal returns pushes rational developers and investors away from vaccine 
research towards common and mainstream drugs or stirs them altogether in favor of investments 
in non-medical technological innovation.   
Furthermore, recent tax changes that expanded and made the R&D credit permanent, yet 
at the same time, narrowed the orphan drug credit from 50% to 25% of clinical trials outlays 
worsened vaccines position.245 Such reduction (made to prevent widespread abuse), in and of 
itself, further lowers the return-on-investment ratio on development of vaccines and rare diseases 
compared to ordinary diseases.246 Providing lower tax incentives to socially desired vaccine 
research that up-front holds less profit-potential nudges companies towards conventional drugs for 
widespread or common illnesses and frustrates the social goal of vaccine preparedness.  
1. A Novel Proposal to Incentivize Vaccine Discovery: Tax Grants  
To solve such discrepancies, we propose to increase available capital for vaccine research 
and its rate of return by adapting current tax incentives to desired levels of vaccine preparedness 
as they appear. We suggest a combination of ex ante apparatuses that combine tax and grant-like 
mechanisms in the form of tax incentives for predetermined list of qualified underfunded 
diseases.247 Vaccine research performed for emerging transmittable diseases on the list will deliver 
firms at the end of the year via their tax returns tax benefits without the need to apply. Increasing 
the level of funding channeled via tax incentives for vaccine discovery may be a balance against 
lowering the level of IP and non-IP incentives, and vice versa.   
Such tax incentives should be provided to firms engaged in vaccine discovery regardless 
of their financial viability. As state above, current market inefficiencies present low incentives for 
vaccine R&D that discourage firms of all types, large or small, in pursuing such endeavor. Yet, 
emerging, smaller-scale life science companies often struggle more to secure financing as they 
present increased risk opportunities for investors. Research, clinical trials and regulatory review 
are cash-intensive and time-consuming, with the prospect of returns often years away. Vaccine 
244 See supra notes 141-153 and accompanying text.    
245 Modification of Orphan Drug Credit, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13401, 131 Stat. 2054, 2133-34 (Dec. 22, 2017). 
246 See Rachel E. Sachs, The Uneasy Case for Patent Law, 117 MICH. L. REV. 499, 512 (2018) (describing this change as the first 
instance of a Congressional walk-back since Congress began creating these incentives in the early 1980s). See also Ryan Cross, 
Drug Company Earnings Outlook Bolstered by Tax Cuts and Repatriated Cash, Chem. & Eng'g News (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://cen.acs.org/articles/96/i7/Drug-company-earnings-outlook-bolstered.html  
247 See infra Part V.A.2.  
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research often presents even more reduced prospects of a return-on-investment. Accordingly, in 
order to maintain the financial and political feasibility of our proposal we suggest applying tax 
incentives for vaccine research in a gradual level. While larger, publicly traded pharmaceutical 
companies may have plenty of alternative sources of financing available, cash-strapped and startup 
pharmaceutical firms much more limited in their access to outside funding. The latter rely more 
heavily on immediate funding through internal sources and outside grants.  
Our framework suggests providing tax incentives for vaccine research to all firms while 
delivering higher degree of tax benefits for private pharmaceutical firms with limited scope, scale, 
and size. We envision a tiered vaccine tax incentives system that will give vaccine developers an 
immediate reduction in their cost of vaccine research at the end of each tax year as opposed to 
rewards given to selective few via grants or prizes at the end of a successfully proven application 
process. Dependent on budget constraints, these tax incentives can be adjusted according to levels 
of vaccine preparedness needed in the U.S. based on world health conditions.  
Past attempts to provide tax-grant-like incentives such as the late QTDP credit mentioned 
above proved there are small pharmaceutical firms willing and able to delve into research of 
neglected and acute diseases if only capital will be accessible. Nevertheless, the high demand for 
QTDP resulted in firms receiving much less funding than they requested in this tax-grant-like 
application. The focus on the grant-nature of the QTDP, as well as its cumbersome application 
process and broad list of qualified approved projects, were several reasons for its failure to provide 
effective and meaningful incentives for long-term pharmaceutical research.   
We offer a simpler model. The central feature of our proposal lies in incorporating tax 
refundability. We propose making existing R&D and the Orphan tax credits refundable on a tiered 
basis for specifically designated list of underfunded diseases with communicable record. This will 
offer pharmaceutical firms for every dollar invested in vaccine research development up to 20 
cents cash back pre-trial and up to 50 cents refund during human trial phase from the government 
at the end of the year regardless of their profitability status. Tax refundability is a main feature of 
our proposal due to its ability to instill greater equity in the market of tax incentives for innovation. 
While the value of deductions and credits depends on firms financial viability, refundable tax 
incentives are not contingent on where firms are situated in the tax brackets. Refundable tax 
incentives for predesignated underfunded vaccine research can play an instrumental role for 
capital-constrains firms in ex ante manner. Moreover, providing tax refunds avoids discrepancies 
in the integral value of tax benefits to firms with diverse applicable tax rates or those with net 
operating losses at the end of the year, such as startup or small pharmaceutical companies.   
Take, for example, startup biotechnology company NewVax with no positive income that 
invested $100,000 in designated vaccine research this year. NewVax will receive a check of 
$20,000 at the end of the year after filing its tax return. On the other hand, publicly traded BigVax 
that invested the same amount could receive a benefit of only $10,000 when filing its tax return, a 
smaller incentive but enough to be captured by managers and investors as increasing the return-
on-investment in vaccine research.  Once the human trial phase begins, for every dollar invested 
the government will offer a refund at the end of the year of 50 cents to NewVax and 25 cents to 
BigVax. The upshot of these tax benefits is that for every $1 NewVax invests in pursuing vaccine 
research it immediately receives from the government 20 cents pre-trial and 50 cents during the 
human trial phase. BigVax will receive from the government only 10 cents pre-trail for every $1 
invested in vaccine research and 25 cents per $1 invested during the human trial phase.  
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Restructuring the current R&D and Orphan drug credits as refundable for selective 
qualified underfunded vaccine research will provide firms with immediate subsidy within a short 
timeframe and cut the long-delayed rewards, that may (or may not) await them, at the end of the 
research and development process. It will guarantee that the public and the government, whose 
priority it is to encourage advance human immunology, vaccine discovery, and immunotherapy 
research for potentially critical infectious diseases, are indirect partners in this endeavor. Such 
mechanisms will have a similar effect to providing a grant to vaccine research but utilize the tax 
system to skip the application process. This will also improve competition in the private market 
for vaccines. There will not be an onerous submission process with limited available spots. All 
companies involved in qualified research in predetermined list of diseases will be eligible to 
receive the benefit based on actual investments reported in their tax return.  
Searching for the vaccine discoveries or new therapeutic breakthroughs entails making 
many observations and studying inefficiencies, incorrect methods, or failed processes with the aim 
of improving them or creating new ones. Our proposal for prioritizing underfunded vaccine 
research via ex ante refundable tax credits and other complementing tax routes248 will further 
enhance knowledge spillover in the pharmaceutical field. We emphasize in our framework the 
notion that every form of genuine vaccine research (performed in the limited list of predesignated 
transmittable diseases) is valuable in providing scientific information to society on pathogen 
structures and mechanism, what therapeutic agent works (or does not work), rather than only 
rewarding selective developers that provide close-to-perfect therapies in a hasty manner solely with 
deadlines and rewards in mind.  
The dissipation of costs of precuring knowledge spillover in vaccine research will be thus 
distributed through the tax system more equitably on all taxpayers as future benefactors of such 
knowledge. Claiming and benefiting from the proposed tax benefits will require firms to publish 
information on their scientific inquiries and preliminary results (while maintaining IP knowledge 
confidential similar to the case of grants and prizes) so to avoid duplication of research efforts. 
Accordingly, while the ex-ante tax incentives will increase the number of participant firms who 
are willing to risk the chance of reaching human immunology breakthroughs, at the same time, it 
will no longer render valueless investments in vaccine discoveries that came in second or third in 
place, or even failed. This approach is supported by prominent innovation scholars that have long 
considered failure as important as and often an inseparable part of the process of attaining
breakthroughs and success.249
2. Administrating A List of Underfunded Emerging Infectious Diseases   
The recent pandemic proved there is immense economic and social value to government 
investment in the future of vaccine research. Accordingly, policymakers should tailor tax rewards 
to advance and adjust priorities based on underfunded, rather than simply orphaned, vaccine 
research. In setting such priorities the government may be in an informational disadvantage 
relative to market actors on the substantial research involved in pathogens and pharmaceutical 
technology development. It may lack the ability to appraise potential projects, funding available 
248 See infra Part V.B.  
249 SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, The Theory of Economic Development (1934), reprinted in THE ENTREPRENEUR: CLASSIC 
TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER 48-50 (Markus C. Becker et al. eds., 2011); KIRZNER, ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 51 (1973) (arguing that entrepreneurial failure is important in facilitating the innovation process).  
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for their development, and their benefits. Accordingly, our proposal suggests an advisory 
committee of domestic health and science organizations such as the FDA, CDC, NIH,  will be 
charged with designating the list of underfunded vaccine research importance based on periodic 
evidence and monitoring of local occurrences, investments, and subsidies available around the 
world. To be clear, the special scientific advisory committee should not be engaged in the decisions 
of who gets the preferential vaccine tax treatment but what underfunded diseases are eligible to be 
on the list. 
Using tax incentives allows the government to focus solely on the decision of setting 
vaccine priorities based on observed evidence and leaving the scientific decisions to the 
pharmaceutical developers. IRS agents should be required only to examine the input of 
predesignated vaccine research projects based on existing definition in the Tax Code of eligible 
research expenses. The output of R&D vaccine research process, whether effective new 
therapeutic breakthrough or not, will be appraised by the scientific community, the public, and the 
market. Adding a refundability feature to the current tax incentives for predesignated vaccine 
research can be an effective behavioral mechanism that could even allow tweaking current levels 
of innovation incentives such as modifying patent protection, grants, and prizes based on budgetary 
and public health priorities. As noted above and as in the current practice with government grants, 
policymakers should require firms to make knowledge from preferential tax treatment for qualified 
vaccine discovery projects available to the public to speed knowledge spillover and refrain from 
paying twice (or more) for the same knowledge procurement process.250
While bolstering the tax system as a locus for incentives to R&D may raise well-founded 
administrability concerns251as well as giving rise to resource-related considerationswe note 
here several features of our proposal that reduce the risk of overburdening the tax system and the 
IRS while administrating our proposal. From a technology perspective, the type of innovation that 
our proposal seeks to incentivize is relatively simpleas evidenced by the recent Ebola, Zika and 
COVID-19 public health crises, vaccine development targeting these types of pathogens can occur 
on considerably expedited timelines. With the exception of one of the leading COVID-19 vaccine 
candidates (an mRNA vaccine developed by Moderna, which, if successful, would introduce a 
new form of vaccine technology)252 many vaccines needed to prevent or mitigate large-scale public 
health crises borrow from pre-existing vaccine technology and components. For instance, the 
leading Zika vaccine candidate developed during the 2015-16 outbreak was adapted from a pre-
existing vaccine developed by the same institution for a pathogen in the same viral family as Zika 
(the pathogen causing Japanese encephalitis).253
Seeing the relative simplicity and identifiability of the underlying list of predesignated 
vaccine technology, our proposal is more easily administrable than a proposal covering 
heterogenous types of technology, or even the entire field of vaccine therapies as a whole. The tax 
incentives we propose can and should be explicitly restricted to research on predesignated vaccine-
preventable transmittable diseasesdiseases for which there are long-felt critical 
250 For a comprehensive discussion of pay-twice arguments, see Rebecca E. Wolitz, The Pay-Twice Critique, Government Funding, 
and Reasonable Pricing Clauses, 39 J. LEG. MED. 177 (2019). 
251 See infra Part V.C.  
252 See MODERNA, Moderna Advances Late-Stage Development of its Vaccine (mRNA-1273) Against COVID-19 (Jun. 11, 2020), 
https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/moderna-advances-late-stage-development-its-vaccine-mrna-
1273 
253 Rutschman, Vaccine Licensure in the Public Interest: Lessons from the Development of the U.S. Army Zika Vaccine 
127 YALE L. J. FORUM 651, 654 (2018). 
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underinvestment, despite the enormous public health toll associated with their occurrence. 
Tailoring the tax-based incentive to this particular set of diseases furthers vaccine-specific research 
goals while implementing a compact incentives regime within the tax system.  
The configuration of pre-selected diseases eligible for these incentives can be easily 
modeled after existing lists tracking either vaccine-preventable diseases for which there are no 
commercially available vaccines or lineups of infectious disease pathogens predicted to emerge in 
the near future. An example of the former are files found in the medical literature by leading 
scientist in the field of vaccinology.254 An example of the latter is offered by the World Health 
Organization list of pathogens expected to cause significant outbreaks in the short- and medium-
term.255 There are also examples of directories of  prize- or grant-eligible diseases in the United 
States pharmaceutical innovation ecosystem: for instance, the priority review voucher program 
administered by the FDA that we surveyed in Part III256 was initially based on an index of voucher-
eligible diseases created by Congress.257 The list was originally limited to 16 diseases, including 
Malaria, Cholera and Tuberculosis, and was later expanded to include other diseases like Ebola 
and Zika.258 Congress gave the FDA the authority to manage the list by adding [a]ny other 
infectious disease for which there is no significant market in developed nations and that 
disproportionately affects poor and marginalized populations.259 The FDA has used this authority 
to expand the directory of diseases, and has also solicited public recommendations on possible 
additions to it.260 Congress itself has intervened in this area, passing legislation that specifically 
added Ebola and Zika to the list during the 2014-15 and 2015-16 outbreaks, respectively.261 Public 
health-oriented agencies in the United Statessuch as the FDA, CDC and NIHare the most 
well-positioned to administer or to play an advisory role in regards to the list of tax benefits-eligible 
diseases in connection with meritorious vaccine research that we propose in this Article. Finally, 
an additional advantage of our vaccine tailored proposal is that it borrows from institutional and 
administrative features that exist already in our legal architecture and innovation tax policy 
apparatuses, which lowers learning, complexity, and compliance costs as will be further detailed 
in Part V.C. 
B. Complementing Routes to Encourage Vaccine Collaboration Through the Tax System 
1. Increasing Collaborations Around Basic Research  
Covid-19 pandemic illustrated that the role of universities in developing vaccines could be 
much greater. Accordingly, the government may seek to further encourage collaborations in 
vaccine research between non-profit organizations and for-profit pharmaceutical firms by 
providing the latter with refundable basic research credit for underfunded designated vaccine 
research. At times, for-profit pharmaceutical firms may find it more efficient to outsource portions 
254 See Plotkin, supra note 238. 
255 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 10, at 22 (2016). 
256 See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text. 
257 See Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA, supra note 126, at 74 (providing an overview of the genesis 
and scope of the priority review voucher program). 
258 Id., at 78-79. 
259 Id., at 79. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
(2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidan ces/ucm080599.pdf, at 4. 
260 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2008-N-0567 (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-N-
0567-nhc.pdf. 
261 Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA, supra note 257 at 87. See S.2917 - Adding Ebola to the FDA 
Priority Review Voucher Program Act; Public Law No: 113-233, Dec.16, 2014. 
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of basic research rather than engage in all intricate facets of the discovery process. Once initial 
scientific progress is made by the contracted non-profit, firms can then take that knowledge and 
commercialize it. Essentially, adding a refundable basic research tax incentive for vaccine R&D 
will even the level of benefits and allow firms to choose the most effective path to procure 
scientific knowledge, whether inhouse or subcontracting with non-profit, without losing the 
preferential tax treatment given to vaccine R&D under our proposal.   
There is already a collaborative tradition in vaccine research during outbreaks of infectious 
diseases in which universities play a salient role. The recent COVID-19 outbreak illustrates this 
point: universities across the United States joined vaccine development projects as early as March 
2020, from the University of Pittsburgh to the University of Texas to Colorado State University.262
Outside the context of pandemics there are currently nine institutionssuch as Emory and Saint 
Louis Universityoperating on a long-term basis as Vaccine and Treatment Evaluation Units 
(VTEUs).263 Our proposed framework can be used to further expand existing collaborative 
networks in the vaccine space. In particular, it incentivizes greater involvement of the non-profit 
sector in pre-clinical vaccine research through the tax credit given to firms in the private sector for 
contracting out basic vaccine research to non-profit entities.  
The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated how collaborations between industry and non-
profit organizations deserve greater attention from an incentives perspective. For example, large 
pharmaceutical company Merck partnered with IAVI, a nonprofit scientific research 
organization,264 to use Merck-owned vaccine technology developed in response to the 2014-16 
Ebola outbreak in research related to a COVID-19 vaccine candidate.265 Absent catalytic public 
health crises like COVID, however, industry-nonprofit collaborations are rarer in the vaccine R&D 
space. Yet, as the Merck/IAVI example shows, there are several types of vaccines that can be 
developed through adaptation of pre-existing vaccine technology.266
Ideally, this type of therapeutic researchwhich relies on relatively simpler and more well-
understood forms of technology than many other types of vaccine researchshould be 
incentivized during the pre-outbreak as strategic research and experimentation to increase our 
levels of preparedness.267 Recent history has nonetheless shown that most players in the private 
sector are fairly irresponsive to these needs before a large-scale outbreak occurs.268 Our proposal 
addresses this disjunction between preparedness needs and market-driven R&D strategies by 
262 See Lilah Burke, The Race for a Vaccine, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Mar. 4, 2020), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/03/04/universities-role-race-develop-vaccine-coronavirus.  
263 See U.S. Natl Inst. Health, Vaccine and Treatment Evaluation Units (VTEU) (2015), 
https://grantome.com/grant/NIH/272201300019I-0-27200001-1. Although VTEUs receive public funding, they are involved in 
clinical trials for vaccine candidates resulting from public-private collaborations.  
264 INTERNATIONAL AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE (IAVI), About, https://www.iavi.org 
265 Sam Meredith, Merck in Collaboration to Develop Coronavirus Vaccine, with Clinical Trials to Start This Year, CNBC (May 
26, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/26/coronavirus-merck-to-develop-vaccine-clinical-trials-to-start-later-this-year.html 
266 Other recent examples of this phenomenon include the U.S. Armys use of a Japanese encephalitis vaccine to develop a Zika 
vaccine candidate on an expedited R&D timeline. See e.g. Annette M. Boyle, Army Research Produces Zika Vaccine Candidate in 
Record Time, U.S. MED. (Aug. 2016), http://www.usmedicine.com/agencies/department-of-defense-dod /army-research-produces-
zika-vaccine-candidate-in-record-time 
267 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 10, at 20. See also Yaniv Heled et al., The Problem with Relying on Profit-Driven Models 
to Produce Pandemic Drugs, __ J. L. BIOSCI. __ (2020). 
268 AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS, supra note 13. 
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incentivizing  players in the vaccine research ecosystem to more regularly partner with nonprofit 
institutions, and to do so before outbreak-induced vaccine races take place in a crowded R&D 
environment.   
2. Incentivizing Patent Donations of Vaccine Technology 
The key non-tax impetuses of patent donations are reducing costs through preserving 
research efforts, better management of intellectual property inventory, and saving maintenance 
fees. Companies like IBM with tens of thousands of patents tend to spend millions of dollars a 
year on maintenance fees.269 Some intellectual property may not be consistent with the firms 
current technological mission, appropriate for licensing to third parties, or valuable in competitive 
markets. In those cases, patent donations can be an effective way to avoid having potentially 
valuable technologies sitting idle or abandoned when they do not fit with the firms existing 
priorities. The deductibility of patent donations provides significant premium. Yet, by eliminating 
the financial benefit of charitable donations of intellectual property the current tax regime fails to 
incentivize socially desirable donations.270
If structured correctly, patent donations can become a catalyzer for vaccine innovation.271
One way the government may encourage private-public collaborations is by modifying the current 
manner by which firms calculate the value of intellectual property relating to vaccine technology 
donated to obtain a charitable deduction. Rather than the formula used from 2004 restricting 
taxpayers to the cost basis of the donated intellectual property (usually trivial or zero), the 
government can revert to the pre-2004 rule that relied on the fair market value (FMV) of the 
donated intellectual property. Indeed, valuations are extremely subjective and appraisals of 
intellectual property are highly susceptible to manipulation especially in vaccine research where 
value of new therapeutics and developments are very hard to identify. Scholars have proposed a 
variety of solutions to prevent future abuse and overvaluation concerns such as structured reporting 
and clearer standards for valuation.272 Others suggested qualified appraisal requirements, penalties 
on appraisers for valuation errors, heightened information requirements, and lengthening the 
statute of limitations.273
As noted above, there have been multiple instances in which patent donations served as an 
important tool for transfer of technology and knowledge spillover across industries.274 Yet, the 
charitable tax deductions of patent donations have suffered from a questionable past and complex 
present. Given the potential of patent donations as catalyst to vaccine research, we propose that 
the government experiment with a patent donation tax regime similar to the one in place before 
2004 with appropriate new anti-abuse mechanisms in the field of vaccine R&D for underfunded 
269 Layton & Bloch, supra note 233. 
270 Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffery A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.S. DAVIS L. REV. 1721 (2006) (criticizing the 2004 
amendment and calling for adopting of a Fair Market Value deduction for Patent donations.).  
271 Bo Carlsson, Jeffrey Glass, Craig Nard & Richard Barrett, Intellectual Property (IP) Management: Organizational Processes 
and Structures, and The Role of IP Donations, 33 J. TECH. TRANSFER 549 (2008) (generating good will, profiting from tax 
deductions and other financial benefits, and philanthropy were motives of the firms to donate their patents.).  
272 Nicholas C. Tomlinson, Tax Abuse Halting Progress? An Inside Look at Patent Donations and Their Tax Deductibility, 35 SW.
U. L. REV. 183 (2006) (explaining a study by Arthur Anderson in 1992 demonstrating the profitability of patent donations  
catalyzed the practice by corporations.).   
273 William A. Drennan, Charitable Donations of Intellectual Property: The Case for Retaining the Fair Market Value Tax 
Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1045 92004) (proposing ways to lessen abuse in patent donations).  
274 Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffery A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.S. DAVIS L. REV. 1721 (2006) (criticizing the 2004 
amendment and calling for adopting of a Fair Market Value deduction for patent donations.).  
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diseases.  
So far, the patent donation mechanism has been overlooked as a strategic tool in vaccine 
innovation policyin spite of an early example of patent donations having occurred precisely in 
connection with vaccine technology, as a donation of involving a patent on a Malaria vaccine 
candidate was made to the World Health Organization in the 1990s.275 A study done shortly before 
the 2004 change interviewing industry, academics, and professionals concluded that most 
corporate donors and university recipients think tax incentives for patent donations have 
nonquantifiable benefits such as developing university-industry collaborations, increasing to 
inventor morale, and providing more research opportunities for faculty. The study concluded 
what policy-makers need is more numbers, more facts, and more information about transactions 
so that the effectiveness of the program can be measured.276
Experimenting with a new and improved patent-donation rule earmarked for a closed 
predesignated list of underfunded diseases should not also require highest complex and substantial 
valuation issues that the advisory committee comprised of FDA, CDC, NIH and other health 
science institutes cannot unravel. Such venturing with a small-scale of intellectual property donors 
and universities in the vaccine field may provide opportunities for learning and fine-tuning of IP 
valuation rules as well as empirical data needed for policymakers to decide whether there is enough 
economic benefit justifying revival or abandonment of this once momentous innovation 
incentive.387
C. Potential Problems    
1. Abuse and Gamesmanship  
We recognize that the creation of specialized incentives regimes can attractand has 
engagedplayers seeking to explore loopholes in the system by mislabeling activities as qualified 
R&D or minimizing R&D investment wherever possible. For instance, in the case of the FDA 
priority vouchers described above,277 the large Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis was 
granted a voucherdesigned to reward meritorious R&Dafter obtaining FDA approval to 
market a combination therapy for Malaria that was already registered in 85 markets outside the 
United States, and which had been in use for the previous 10 years.278
In contrast with more transversal embodiments of incentives regimes such as the voucher 
program, ours is tailored to a very narrow list of predetermined underfunded infectious diseases 
and a specific set of biopharmaceutical technologies thus less prone to gamesmanship. It is possible 
to condition the tax incentives to cases in which a company is the first to develop a vaccine 
targeting a specific disease, which would ensure that significant levels of R&D would have to 
occur for the tax benefit to applymodeled more as tax prizes rather than tax grants.  
275 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., SCIENTISTS WITH VISION: DR. MANUEL ELKIN PATARROYO (Sept. 2005), 
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2005/05/article_0002.html  
276 Layton & Bloch, supra note 233.  
387 But see Natbony, supra note 174 (analyzing tax incentives for R&D); RinLaures & Janofsky, supra note 374 (discussing recent 
developments concerning Orphan Drug Act); Kenney, supra note 373 (discussing whether Orphan Drug Act inhibits innovation or 
creates unintended windfalls). [Check out this Scholarly criticism on R&D tax incentives]. 
277 Supra, Part III.C.  
278 See Tatum Anderson, Novartis Under Fire for Accepting New Reward for Old Drug, 373 THE LANCET 1414, 1414 (2009). 
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Yet, even if the tax incentive is set more broadlyfor instance, for vaccine research on 
incentive-eligible diseases the likelihood for gamesmanship is lower. Given the nature of the goods 
at stake, the same is true even in cases when the research and experimentation does not result in 
final approval of a vaccine. The types of vaccines needed to prevent and curb outbreaks of diseases 
like Zika or COVID-19 are relatively straightforward forms of technological discoveries with a 
predominantly preventative function.279 Unlike several other types of pharmaceutical products, a 
given vaccine is unlikely to address multiple conditions. 
Consider the following scenario: Humira, the worlds top blockbuster drug in the 2010s, 
has successively received cumulative market approval from regulatory agencies around the world 
for a broad range of conditions, from adult and juvenile forms of rheumatoid arthritis to multiple 
types of psoriasis and gastrointestinal diseases.280 A given vaccine cannot be deployed to target 
such a large swath of conditions.281 As a primarily preventative, low-profit (if any), largely single-
condition type of technology, vaccines serve limited purposesalbeit crucial from a public health 
perspectiveand have fewer entry points into the regulatory ad hoc incentive system available to 
them. For those reasons, players willing to enter the vaccine R&D arena expect their return on 
investment to be inherently limited.282 Between the relative simplicity of vaccine technology and 
the reduced prospects of profit-maximization, both motivation and opportunity for gamesmanship 
in this area are significantly lower than elsewhere in pharmaceutical innovation, even when 
factoring our proposed tax incentives. 
2. Complexity  
Intellectual property confers monopoly-like power to patent holders, enabling them to 
charge supra-competitive prices to consumers. Contingent upon demand elasticity, monopoly may 
create deadweight loss due to the fact that fewer customers will purchase the overpriced product.283
Similar to patents, cash awards, or any government intervention, taxation unavoidably involves 
deadweight loss as well. In the framework of imposed taxes, that loss may be created via higher 
product price to account for, and pass onwards to customers, the additional tax cost, which lowers 
market demand and creates considerable deadweight loss.284 In the tax incentives context, 
279 See supra notes 252-253 and accompanying text.   
280 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (HUMIRA), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/125057s232lbl.pdf. See generally Rutschman, supra note 60.   
281 We again note that our proposal expressly excludes any emerging forms of vaccine technology, such as the mRNA vaccine 
currently being developed being develop for COVID-19. It is also important to underscore that most vaccine R&D for the types of 
underfunded diseases contemplated in our proposal rely on standard, well-established forms of technology, not on cutting-edge 
technology. As of late June 2020, Modernas mRNA vaccine was the sole R&D project among leading candidates relying on non-
standard technology (in a universe of over 140 COVID-19 vaccine R&D projects). See MILKEN INST., COVID-19 TREATMENT AND 
VACCINE TRACKER, https://covid-19tracker.milkeninstitute.org (last accessed Jun. 23, 2020) 
282 Rutschman, supra note 39, at 742. 
283 For a discussion on pricing Covid-19 vaccines see, e.g., Joseph Walker, Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir to Cost $3,120 for Typical 
Patient, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 29, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-drug-remdesivir-to-cost-3-120-for-typical-patient-
11593428402 (discussing pricing plans for remdesivir); Katherine J. Wu, Some Vaccine Makers Say They Plan to Profit From 
Coronavirus Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/health/covid-19-vaccine-coronavirus-
moderna-pfizer.html (noting Moderna, however, which has been granted $483 million from the government to develop its product, 
made no promise to sell at reduced price); Arlene Weintraub, Moderna's Rumored $50-Plus Price on Covid-19 Vaccine Draws Ire 
as Company Touts New Animal Data, FIERCE PHARMA (Jul. 29, 2020), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/moderna-s-rumored-
50-plus-price-covid-19-vaccine-draws-ire-as-company-touts-new-animal-data (comparing proposed price plans for Covid-19 
vaccines). 
284 See generally David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in The Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1656 
(1999) (The most efficient tax system raises the necessary revenue with the lowest deadweight loss.).  
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deadweight loss may be created due to externalities that arise from taxpayers compliance and the 
organization of government.285 Regardless, our goal here is not to accurately estimate the cost of 
administering the tax mechanisms we proposed earlier. Rather, we aim to outline potential issues 
that may arise when offering and administrating our proposal, while pointing to their narrower 
capacity in the vaccine context.   
Similar to any tax scheme, employing tax incentives involves resources taxpayers devote 
to conform with tax laws.286 The more complex tax rules are, the higher the costs required to 
implement them. These compliance and implementation costs are not negligible and may consist 
of human, financial, intangible, and tangible capital required from both the IRS and taxpayers in 
applying the rules. They may include costs of completing tax forms, record keeping, reporting, 
auditing, monitoring, negotiating, advise-seeking, enforcing, and so on. Implementation costs that 
are too high may render certain tax incentives undesirable from a social normative significance.287
Another form of deadweight loss relates to organization of government that may derive 
from inefficient administrability or high enforcement costs. Scholars have argued that in the choice 
of optimal innovation-inducing strategies the organization of government dictates that cash 
transfers are generally superior to tax incentives.288 Subject-matter agencies possess higher 
specialization in technological and scientific matters than the IRS that lacks economies of scope 
in administration and enforcement and simpler intra-agency coordination in that field.289 For 
example, some of the intricacies of administrating R&D tax incentives involve having to determine 
which expenses are experimental, laboratory-like, or related to information discovery.290 These 
actions consist of monitoring the technological progress over time, evaluating the R&D process, 
assessing the scientific or technological nature of the produce, dividing the production process 
between R&D (deductible) and non-R&D (non-deductible) parts and phases, etc.291 These actions 
may commend scientific expertise the IRS does not possess and that is unrelated to its mission of 
collecting revenue in an efficient, equitable and simple manner.292 These IRS determinations 
increase taxpayer uncertainty on attaining and relying on the tax benefit. It is possible, of course, 
to create more divisions within the IRS to better facilitate specialization in vaccine technology and 
285 Frischmann, supra note 21, at 385 (stating "the tax system may have high administrative costs compared with other corrective 
mechanisms.).  
286 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Response, Tailoring Incentives: A Comment on Hemel and Ouellette's Beyond the Patents-Prizes 
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 131, 137 (2014) (outlining compliance and enforcement costs). 
287 See Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 36 VA. TAX REV. 25, 41 (2017) (developing an 
organizational theory of implementation costs based on tax expenditures.). But see Shaun P. Mahaffy, Note, The Case for Tax: A 
Comparative Approach to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L. J 812, 832 (2014) (discussing the advantages of tax credits lower 
administrative costs); Xuan-Thao Nguyen and Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual Property Taxation: Promoting 
Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals, 64 SMU L. REV. 795 (2011) (comparing the benefits of utilizing tax v. IP as 
incentives for innovation).  
288 Nussim & Sorek, supra note 287 at 57.   
289 Id.
290 See Israel Klein, Contemptuous Tax Reporting, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1208 (2019) (demonstrating that some managers use 
self-reporting of R&D expenditures in order to contemptuously inflate entitlement to R&D tax incentives).  
291 Id. at 1209.   
292 See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse?, 
69 TAX L. REV. 419, 444 (2016) (claiming the tax credit leaves an open-ended evaluation process between the government and 
private parties).     
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pharmaceutical innovation, but this inevitably increases the intra-organizational costs of 
coordinating between the divisions.293
When applied to the context of predesignated underfunded vaccine research, our optimal 
choice of incentive level should compare the extent of the deadweight loss from compliance and 
organizational administrability from each apparatus (patents, grants, prizes and tax incentives). 
Certainly, assuring the R&D and orphan tax credits as well as basic research credit and patent 
donations would be available past administrative audit is a big hurdle.294 Their complexity and rate 
of controversy affect the deadweight loss created in applying and administrating these innovation 
tax incentives. Yet, our proposals limited application to a closed list of underfunded diseases 
governed by an expert advisory committee should resolve much of such controversies. 
As far as organizational administrability, our proposed vaccine-inducing tax apparatuses 
directly relate to, complement activities within, and may benefit from, the IRS expertise.295 The 
IRS already observes, measures, and enforces input variables such as income, expenses, 
organizational choice, financial instruments, without the need for scientific or technological 
expertise. Indeed, the IRS has no knowledge of biopharmaceutical issues, nor should it have any, 
in administrating vaccine research. Under our proposal, the IRS should have a non-discretionary, 
or marginally discretionary, administration of the proposed tax incentives. All it needs to do is 
apply, monitor, and audit the rules based on the discretion applied by the specialized health 
advisory committee in devising a list of predesignated underfunded diseases. In that sense, the tax 
incentives operate as grant-like in requiring fit of their nature (rather than their scope) with 
predigested list. Our proposed solution may also provide future insights in the contexts of inter-
agency coordination, managing potential runaway costs, and experimenting with new practices of 
inducing socially desirable scientific and technological innovation.
3. Political Economy and Public Choice 
Tax Scholars have relied on public choice theory to describe the effect of the political 
process on tax legislation.296 They claimed that tax subsidies are particularly susceptible for abuse 
by special interest groups because they offer political rent-extraction and rent-seeking 
opportunities.297 Some empirical scholarship reported  politicians acting to reduce the tax burden 
of, and even exempt, the politically affluent from taxation at the expense of less influential 
293 Nussim & Sorek, supra note 287, at 49.  But see David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 275, 303 (2015) 
(arguing the government often lacks the expertise (and political independence) to choose technological winners in the non-tax 
context).  
294 See CRS Report RL31181, Research Tax Credit: Current Law and Policy Issues for the 114th Congress, by Gary Guenther; and 
CRS In Focus IF10757, The 2017 Tax Law (P.L. 115-97) and Investment in Innovation, by Gary Guenther. Add cite to # of reported 
cases involving disputes under the R&D tax credits.  
295 Nussim & Sorek, supra note 287, at 77 (admitting that certain Innovation-inducing programs may be contingent, inter alia, on 
income or expenses, which are strongly related to IRS activities.).  
296 See, e.g, Jennifer Brown, Katharine Drake & Laura Wellman, The Benefits of a Relational Approach to Corporate Political 
Activity: Evidence from Political Contributions to Tax Policymakers, 37 J. AM. TAXN ASSOCN 69 (2013).  
297 See e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV.
335, 337 (2006) (describing temporary tax provisions as rent-extracting device for politicians to continue to receive rent payments); 
Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What It Is Supposed to Do (and No More), 106 
YALE L.J. 1449, 1465-66 (1997) (noting public choice theory plays a central role in providing opportunities for political players to 
remain relevant); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by 
Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66-68 (1990) (claiming a key motive of certaintax  legislation is rent extracting).  
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participants in the political process.298 The problem is arguably exacerbated in the context of 
innovation tax incentives because while there is bipartisan consensus on the need for such benefits 
there is limited knowledge about the extent of their output.299 This is due to the fact that developing 
innovations involves uninsurable and unmeasurable risks as well as little information on costs or 
prospective social value.300
The public choice argument that follows holds that the cross-party agreement on the need 
to encourage innovation coupled with much unknown about innovation outputs may create 
increased political opportunities for different market players to secure tax privileges at the expense 
of other taxpayers. As opposed to patents and awards that provide benefits at the end of a successful 
research and development process, tax legislation might create greater opportunities ex ante thus 
amplifies the efforts of lobbyists kept on retainer and congressional members to exchange rents in 
return to promoting innovation tax benefits.301 Some academics go as far as calling for the repeal 
of such benefits for public choice concerns claiming genuine innovators and startup firms are 
seldom the beneficiaries of innovation subsidies.302 They point to data on certain political pressures 
large corporation employ on Congress and the IRS in creating and interpreting innovation tax 
subsidies.303 They rely on the fact that the absolute majority of corporate R&D credit is claimed 
by large firms compared to start-up firms although de facto this benefit is not limited by input 
level.304
In the pharmaceutical innovation context though, nonpatent incentives may be prone to 
political influence, and drug companies may be reticent to innovate primarily in reliance on 
nonpatent incentives, if they are perceived as more likely to be revised downward.305 While these 
public choice concerns hold value, a normative justification for the use of tax incentives 
specifically for vaccine research is lacking. Our proposal is not to get rid of current intellectual 
property protection and cash transfers for vaccine research but to complement them with 
experimental framework that provides tax benefits to narrowly tailored list of underfunded 
diseases. Such limited list, in and of itself, significantly lowers that opportunities of political rent-
seeking.  
298 See, e.g., Raquel Alexander, Stephen Mazza & Susan Scholz, Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An 
Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations, 25 J.L. & POL. 401 (2009); Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert 
Samphantharak & Jeffrey F. Timmons, Lobbying and Taxes, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 893 (2009).  
299 See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 139 (2000) 
(arguing the sources of innovation are unknown and differ by industry).    
300 See generally, Schumpeter, supra note 16, at 258; KNIGHT, supra note 16, at  43-44 (noting uncertainty represents unknown and 
uninsurable future events).  
301 See Charles Delmotte, The Case Against Tax Subsidies in Innovation Policy, 48 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 53 (forthcoming 2020) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3564793 (tax incentives allocate rewards via the political process. Given 
realistic assumptions about political opportunism, we can predict that they are subject to rent-seeking.). But see LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 20, at 1415 (claiming concentrated investors interests affect the legislative process towards overprotection of patents.).   
302 Delmotte, supra note 301 at 47.  
303 Id. n.230-231 citing to William Natbony, Tax Incentives for Research and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO.
L.J. 347, 407415 (1987); Evan Wamsley, The Definition of Qualified Research Under the Section 41 Research and Development 
Tax Credit: Its Impact on the Credits Effectiveness, 87 VA. L. REV. 165, 19095 (2001); BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN MICHAEL 
TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY
(2017). But see Robert D. Atkinson, Expanding the R&E Tax Credit to Drive Innovation, Competitiveness and Prosperity, 32 J.
TECH. TRANSFER 617, 623 (2007) (arguing in favor of expanding the R&D credit); Jennifer Venghaus, Tax Incentives: A Means of 
Encouraging Research and Development for Homeland Security, 37 RICH. U. L. REV., 1213, 1230 (proposing to utilize tax 
incentives to spur R&D for homeland security); Mahaffy, supra note 287 (calling for the utilization of tax incentives for innovation).   
304 Some reasons for this phenomenon may including complexity, low salience, and lack of compliance resources. 
305 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 366 (2007).   
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Lastly, our proposal provides opportunities to reexamine optimal innovation incentives in 
a polity as a whole. With proper design, cash transfers for vaccine research can be restated as 
refundable tax incentives and produce superior ex ante results. The task of spurring 
biopharmaceutical research should not be allocated solely to patents, grants, prizes, vouchers, etc.. 
Innovation-inducing tax incentives for development of pathogens or pharmaceutical technologies 
should be utilized more widely by various government programs to increase likelihood of 
achieving optimal outcomes sooner and prior to commencement of an outbreak. Experimenting 
with such apparatuses can serve as a model and help rethink research incentives design to 
encompass different levels of IP and non-IP capacities while aiming to narrow each combinations 
complexity, abuse opportunities, and rent seeking.  
VI. CONCLUSION
Vaccine research in emerging infectious diseases remains plagued by severe 
underinvestment that exposes both markets and health systems to significant social costs. The 
COVID-19 pandemic left the world in shockwave, unprepared for its extensive public health and 
economic toll. Pharmaceutical knowledge has always entailed vast positive externalities associated 
with information production. Yet, governments abruptly were forced to realize the social 
significance of procuring such knowledge in more robust ways. The pandemic has profoundly 
demonstrated the need to reconsider the conventional wisdom about the key role of IP incentives 
to the development of pathogens and technologies for rapidly transmitted diseases.306
Present laws do not provide adequate incentives designed to encourage investment in 
vaccine research in emerging infectious diseases. In fact, current innovation tax incentives that 
apply largely in homogenous ways to differentiated types of innovation achieve the opposite and 
push firms to prioritize technological research projects with higher commercialization value and 
repeated clienteles. By focusing on the case study of pharmaceutical innovations we hope to have 
established ways in which taxation can play a more dominant part in encouraging research in the 
vaccine space. The optimal nature of tax incentives for vaccine research should incorporate a 
normative choice not only between pharmaceutical versus mainstream innovation projects. A more 
robust tax framework holds promise to increase significantly ex ante rewards for research in the 
field of immunotherapy, thus encourage more market players to enter, compete, and collaborate in 
vaccine development that beholds high social value. 
Our proposal also allows policymakers to distribute the social cost of vaccines on all 
taxpayers in a more just and equitable manner. Prioritizing research performed in a predesignated 
list of underfunded transmittable diseases works in a blind manner as opposed to cash-based direct 
incentives that may be influenced by the type of innovation, industry, costs, and location 
characteristics. Moreover, our suggestion for tiered refundable tax incentives and complementing 
routes introduces heterogeneity in application of tax incentives for innovation. As opposed to 
current deductions and credits, refundable tax incentives are not contingent on annual tax brackets 
306 See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 990 (1997) 
(providing an overview of the relationship between patents and inventive improvements). See also Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 
81, at 327. 
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thus as such they prevent divergence in the built-in value of benefits to firms with different 
applicable rates or no positive tax liability at all such as startup or small life-science companies.  
We proposed to experiment with limited-scope tax incentives for development of 
pathogens or pharmaceutical technologies to overcome underinvestment in this field by providing 
firms a higher rate of return when undertaking such research. After the dust settles on the current 
pandemic, policymakers will need to fine-tune the legal system to be better prepared the next one. 
Our framework provides a starting point for legal experimentation ahead of the next pandemic.  
*    *    * 
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